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Safeguards and security (S&S) systems for nuclear facilities include material 
control and accounting (MC&A) and a physical protection system (PPS) to protect 
nuclear materials from theft, sabotage and other malevolent human acts.  The PPS for a 
facility is evaluated using probabilistic analysis of adversary paths on the basis of 
detection, delay, and response timelines to determin  timely detection.  The path analysis 
methodology focuses on systematic, quantitative evaluation of the physical protection 
component for potential external threats, and often calculates the probability that the PPS 
is effective (PE) in defeating an adversary who uses that attack path.  By monitoring and 
tracking critical materials, MC&A activities provide additional protection against inside 
adversaries, but have been difficult to characterize in ways that are compatible with the 
existing path analysis methods that are used to systematically evaluate the effectiveness 
of a site’s protection system.  This research describes and demonstrates a new method to 
incorporate MC&A protection elements explicitly within the existing probabilistic path 
analysis methodology.  MC&A activities, from monitor ng to inventory measurements, 
xi 
provide many, often recurring opportunities to determine the status of critical items, 
including detection of missing materials.  Human reliability analysis methods are applied 
to determine human error probabilities to characterize the detection capabilities of 
MC&A activities.  An object-based state machine paradigm was developed to 
characterize the path elements of an insider theft scenario as a race against MC&A 
activities that can move a facility from a normal state to a heightened alert state having 
additional detection opportunities.  This paradigm is coupled with nuclear power plant 
probabilistic risk assessment techniques to incorporate the evaluation of MC&A activities 
in the existing path analysis methodology.  Event sequence diagrams describe insider 
paths through the PPS and also incorporate MC&A activities as path elements.  This 
work establishes a probabilistic basis for incorporating MC&A activities explicitly within 
the existing path analysis methodology to extend it to address insider threats.  The 
analysis results for this new method provide an integrated effectiveness measure for a 
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Chapter 1:  Introduction 
Safeguards and security (S&S) systems for nuclear facilities are required to 
protect nuclear materials from theft, sabotage, andother malevolent human acts.  
Generally, a site’s S&S system is comprised of four verlapping components:  physical 
protection, material control and accounting (MC&A), personnel security and information 
security.  The physical protection system (PPS) for a facility is evaluated using 
probabilistic analysis of adversary paths on the basis of detection, delay, and response 
timelines to determine timely detection.  The path nalysis methodology focuses on a 
systematic, quantitative evaluation of the physical protection component of the system for 
potential external threats, and often calculates th probability that the PPS is effective in 
defeating an adversary who uses that attack path (probability of effectiveness, PE).  This 
effectiveness measure is the degree to which the PPS can protect a broad spectrum of 
targets against a wide range of potential threats.  Other qualitative approaches have been 
used for MC&A, personnel security, and information security components of the S&S 
protection system [1-4]. 
Insider adversaries represent formidable threats to the protection of critical assets, 
including information and materials.  This threat tkes many forms ranging from petty 
theft and fraud to theft of critical assets to espionage and terrorism.  Depending on their 
positions, insiders can be very capable security threats because they have knowledge of 
operations and the opportunity to access target materials.  For facilities that have security 
systems in place to protect critical assets, these individuals have access “inside” the 
protective measures.  They can take advantage of opportunities that arise to circumvent 
system elements or to exploit system vulnerabilities and access a target directly without 
being detected.  The detection and delay timelines ar  not as relevant because insiders 
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can choose the most opportune times and optimum strategies, often using protracted or 
discontinuous attacks.  One strategy for addressing the insider threat would be to 
optimize the control and accountability of materials, and to more fully account for 
MC&A elements in the evaluation of the effectiveness of the S&S protection system. 
1.1 MATERIAL CONTROL AND ACCOUNTING PROTECTION SYSTEM 
S&S requirements for MC&A primarily address control and accountability 
functions including access control, surveillance, material transfers, measurements, and 
physical inventories.  MC&A operations that track and account for critical assets at 
nuclear facilities provide a key protection approach for defeating insider adversaries.  
MC&A functions such as personnel access control and utomated surveillance overlap 
with PPS functions and are addressed by current path analysis methods.  Some MC&A 
protections are already incorporated, although perhaps not explicitly identified as such, in 
the current approach to evaluating the effectiveness of a PPS.  For example, procedures 
and authorizations for material transfers are addressed within PPS elements that provide 
access between protection layers, such as a personnl r vehicle portal.  Other operational 
activities, such as measurements and physical inventori s, have been difficult to 
characterize in ways that are compatible with the path analysis methods that are currently 
used to systematically evaluate the effectiveness of a site’s protection system.  “At the 
very least, the effectiveness of certain elements has not been rigorously quantified; worse, 
those elements are sometimes ignored, or simply assumed to be effective” [5].  One 
approach for addressing this gap uses deterministic Material Assurance Indicators (MAIs) 
as a metric to evaluate MC&A activities that are involved in protecting nuclear materials 
[6, 7].  Initial testing successfully demonstrated that the MAI algorithm is useful for 
evaluating characteristics of MC&A system capability, but it is not truly probabilistic.  
Thus, the MAI algorithm is not compatible with probabilistic path analysis methods. 
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Early in the development of the MAI algorithm, it became apparent that MC&A 
activities at an item level could be considered a type of sensor system, with both alarm 
and assessment capabilities that are necessary for detection.  The MAI also provides an 
approach for evaluating an MC&A system capability to provide detection of an insider 
attempting theft of nuclear material [7].  In addition, MC&A activities, from monitoring 
to inventory measurements, include a variety of methods for providing information about 
the attributes and location of target materials andfor defining security elements useful 
against insider threats.  These activities can also serve to discourage insiders from 
engaging in malevolent activity and provide many, often recurring opportunities to 
determine the status of critical items.   
Given this characterization of MC&A activities and the formulation of the 
existing path analysis methodology, it is reasonable to investigate probabilistic risk 
assessment (PRA) methods that may be applicable to the development of a probabilistic 
approach to characterize MC&A activities and to evaluate the MC&A component to 
provide an overall effectiveness measure of the S&Sprotection system to address threats 
from both insider and outsider adversaries.   
1.2 GOAL AND OBJECTIVES  
The goal of this research is to develop a probabilistic basis and a new method to 
incorporate MC&A protection elements explicitly within the existing probabilistic path 
analysis methodology that is used to systematically evaluate the effectiveness of a site’s 
protection system.  To accomplish this, three problem areas need to be addressed:  
• “Detection” capabilities of MC&A protections and quantitative probabilities of 
detection – individually, in combination, and as a function of time; 
• Competing delay and detection timelines for insider th ft versus facility detection; 
and 
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• Scenario development to integrate the evaluation of PPS and MC&A protections 
within physical protection layers.   
The objectives of this work include applying PRA techniques to develop 
approaches to address these problems.  Human reliability nalysis (HRA) techniques are 
investigated for characterizing and providing quantit tive measures for MC&A elements 
in a manner compatible with probabilistic analyses.  An object-based state machine 
paradigm is developed to characterize insider theft as a race against detection by facility 
MC&A activities.   This paradigm is coupled with nuclear power plant PRA techniques 
to characterize detection and delay timelines for MC&A protection elements and 
provides the framework for applying convolution mathematics to calculate timely 
detection.  Event sequence diagrams (ESDs) are applied to develop evaluation scenarios 
for insider paths through the PPS and also incorporate MC&A activities as path elements.  
The objectives also include demonstrating the new method with an analysis for several 
hypothetical theft scenarios.  
The development of such a probabilistic approach will enable security analysts to 
explicitly evaluate the effectiveness of MC&A protections against insider threats similar 
to the evaluation of outsider threats performed under the existing probabilistic path 
analysis methodology.  Along with the PE for the PPS, the overall result is an integrated 
effectiveness measure of a protection system that addresses threats from both outsider 
and insider adversaries.  
1.3 DISSERTATION ORGANIZATION  
This section provides an introduction, overview of an MC&A protection system, 
and the goals and objectives of this research.  The remainder of this dissertation is 
organized as follows:   
5 
• Chapter 2 presents background material on physical protection, MC&A, the path 
analysis methodology, characterization and evaluation of the insider threat, and 
risk analysis tools.   
• Chapter 3 presents the details of the extended methodology for one MC&A daily 
activity in one physical protection layer.   
• Chapter 4 presents the analyses used to demonstrate this new methodology for 
multiple physical protection layers.   
• Chapter 5 presents conclusions and recommendations for additional work.   
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Chapter 2:  Background 
The background for this research covers several topics, including: 
• S&S system assessment methodology, 
• Physical protection, 
• MC&A, 
• Design and evaluation of a PPS, 
• Insider studies, and 
• Risk assessment tools. 
Each of these topics is discussed in the following sections. 
2.1 SAFEGUARDS AND SECURITY SYSTEM ASSESSMENT METHODOLOGY  
Design and evaluation of S&S protection systems generally follows a tailored 
systems engineering process.  The system assessment methodology, shown in Figure 1, 
has evolved as a framework for assessing S&S systems o protect nuclear assets within 
the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) over 30 years [8].  This framework has been 
adopted in some form by many organizations both in the U.S. and around the world for 
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Figure 1. The system assessment methodology used by the U.S. DOE for the design 
and evaluation of S&S protection systems [8]. 
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Generally, a site’s S&S system is comprised of four verlapping components:  
physical protection, MC&A, personnel security and information security.  The three 
integrated functions of all S&S protection systems, including the physical protection and 
MC&A components, are detection, delay, and response.  Detection is determining that an 
unauthorized action has occurred or is occurring.  Detection includes sensing the action, 
generating an alarm signal, communicating the alarm, and assessing that unauthorized 
actions has occurred.  Assessment is when a person determines the cause of an alarm and 
judges it to be valid or invalid (a false or nuisance alarm).  Delay is the slowing down of 
the adversary’s progress toward the objective (theft or sabotage).  Characterization of 
delay establishes the time required by the adversary to bypass or defeat each delay 
protection element.  Common physical delay elements include fences, wall, doors, locks, 
safes, and active and passive barriers.  In combination, delay and detection elements 
provide layers of protection that extend from a target to the exterior of the site.  Response 
primarily consists of the actions taken by the protective force to prevent adversary 
success.  In this physical response situation, it is important to characterize the response 
force time (RFT), which is the time elapsed from detection to the response team arriving 
at the adversary’s location with sufficient capabilities to interrupt the adversary’s tasks 
and ultimately neutralize the attack. 
2.1.1 Physical Protection 
For the U.S. DOE S&S program, physical protection is defined as: 
“PHYSICAL PROTECTION.  The application of physical or technical methods 
designed to protect personnel; prevent or detect unauthorized access to facilities, 
material, and documents; protect against espionage, sabotage, damage, and theft; 
respond to any such acts should they occur.” [16] 
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Garcia [17, 18] discusses the design and evaluation of a PPS in detail.  The purpose of a 
PPS is to protect important assets from theft, sabotage, or other malevolent attacks.  The 
design of a PPS considers how to combine physical delay elements with sensors, 
procedures, communication devices, and security personnel to best achieve the overall 
detection, delay and response functions to meet a protection objective.  Evaluation of a 
PPS design or an existing PPS includes characterizing physical protection elements and 
their detection, delay, and response functions and determining the PPS effectiveness, 
usually through a probabilistic path analysis.   
2.1.2 Nuclear Material Control and Accountability 
For the U.S. DOE S&S program, MC&A, nuclear materials ccountability, and 
nuclear materials control are defined as follows: 
MATERIAL CONTROL AND ACCOUNTING (MC&A).  “Those parts of the 
safeguards program designed to provide information on, control of, and assurance 
of the presence of nuclear materials, including those systems necessary to 
establish and track nuclear material inventories, control access to and detect loss 
or diversion of nuclear material, and ensure the int grity of those systems and 
measures.”  [16] 
“NUCLEAR MATERIALS ACCOUNTABILITY.  The part of the Material 
Control and Accountability program encompassing the procedures and systems 
to: 
1. perform nuclear material measurements, 
2. verify the locations and quantities of nuclear materi l through physical 
inventories, 
3. maintain records and provide reports, 
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4. perform data analyses to account for nuclear materials and to detect losses, 
and 
5. investigate and resolve apparent losses of nuclear material.” [16] 
“NUCLEAR MATERIALS CONTROL.  The part of the safeguards program 
encompassing management and process controls to: 
1. assign and exercise responsibility for nuclear materials; 
2. maintain vigilance over the materials; 
3. govern movement, location, and use of the materials; 
4. monitor inventory and process status; 
5. detect unauthorized activities for all nuclear materi ls; and 
6. help to investigate and resolve apparent losses of nuclear materials.”  [16] 
Over the years, various technologies and methods have been developed and applied to 
enhance nuclear material control [19-31].  These technologies range from software and 
systems for continuous monitoring and inventory verification to personnel tracking to 
monitoring weight and radiation attributes to real-time process monitoring.  These 
technologies are evaluated through testing and demonstration exercises that do not 
generally address the overall system effectiveness of the MC&A component of an S&S 
protection system.  MC&A procedures and technologies, from monitoring to inventory 
measurements, include a variety of methods that provide information about the attributes 
and location of target materials.   
More recently, the U.S. DOE’s National Nuclear Security Agency (NNSA) has 
been working to implement the Safeguards First Principles Initiative (SFPI) as a 
principle-based, risk-management standard for MC&A programs [20-22].  The SFPI 
focuses on the effectiveness of the plan and procedures that are developed to implement 
the requirements of an MC&A program at an individual NNSA site.  The Comprehensive 
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Analysis of Safeguards Strategies (COMPASS) model is an MC&A system effectiveness 
evaluation tool that has been developed as part of the SFPI initiative to compile site input 
about nine MC&A program elements and their respectiv  sub-elements and their ratings 
for effectiveness weighted by a contribution factor, then provides an overall weighted 
average that reflects the overall health of the MC&A program [20].  The COMPASS 
effectiveness ratings are based on performance data and assessments of the MC&A 
program elements and are reviewed by an evaluation board.  The effectiveness ratings of 
the 10-point scale are determined by objective criteria and reflect qualitative ratings of 
high (8-10), medium (5-7) and low (1-4).  The contribution factors are applied as an 
indication of the relative importance of an element a d are determined from a 0-4 point 
scale, where a factor of 4 is assigned to an element that “provides loss detection or 
accounts for material” [22].  The SFPI efforts focus on evaluation of the overall 
programmatic effectiveness of an MC&A program, the requirements of which include the 
detection and deterrence of theft and diversion of material [21].  While the SFPI 
evaluation addresses detection of theft as part of the programmatic requirements, the 
effectiveness ratings do not reflect the determinatio  of a probability of detection that 
material is missing or do not specifically address insider theft scenarios or integration 
with PPS elements.  
2.2 DESIGN AND EVALUATION OF A PHYSICAL PROTECTION SYSTEM  
Garcia [17, 18] provides a comprehensive discussion of methods and their 
application for designing a PPS and evaluating its effectiveness.  Figure 1 illustrates the 
overall systems engineering process for an S&S system.  The parallel process flow for the 
PPS component is the Design and Evaluation Process Outline (DEPO) shown in Figure 2.  
The effectiveness of a site’s protection systems is sy tematically evaluated using 
qualitative and/or quantitative techniques and is often calculated as the probability of PPS 
11 
effectiveness (PE), which is a measure of the degree to which the system can protect a 
broad spectrum of targets against a wide range of potential threats.  The DEPO 
methodology focuses on a systematic quantitative evaluation of the physical protection 
component of the S&S system for attack by potential outsider adversaries, whereas other 
qualitative approaches have been used for MC&A, personnel security and information 













































Figure 2. Design and evaluation process outline for physical protection systems [17]. 
The goal of DEPO is to systematically evaluate the eff ctiveness of a site’s S&S 
PPS using objective performance criteria.  In this context, an effective PPS consists of 
protection elements that provide 
• timely and accurate detection and assessment of undesire  acts, 
• timely communication of this information to a response component, 
• mechanisms that delay adversaries long enough for the response component to 
intervene, and 
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• a response component capable of preventing adversaries from completing 
undesired acts. 
The overall effectiveness of the system depends upon the performance of each of the 
components individually, as well as the interaction and performance of the system as a 
whole.  If the site does not meet the protection objectives, a vulnerability assessment [18, 
32] identifies specific PPS weaknesses that could potentially be exploited by malevolent 
threats.  PPS upgrades are then implemented to achieve a system effectiveness that meets 
the protection objectives. 
The remainder of this section focuses on the quantitative analysis methods to 
evaluate system effectiveness for the PPS component.  To determine the effectiveness of 
a PPS, path analysis is performed to evaluate adversary paths and the associated 
detection, delay and response timelines.  The facility is characterized in terms of physical 
areas, protection layers, protection elements, pathelements, path segments, and target 
locations.  Each protection layer contains delay and detection protection elements that 
define the path elements and path segments of possible adversary paths.  Figure 3 
illustrates the physical areas of a facility and includes an example of adversary paths.  
Figure 4 illustrates the physical areas and protecti n elements as an adversary sequence 
diagram (ASD).  PI is the probability of interruption of the adversary’s progress.  Path 
analysis determines PI as a quantitative measure of timely detection on an adversary path.  
“Timely detection is the principle that system effectiveness is measured by the 
cumulative probability of detection at the point where there is still enough time remaining 
for the response force to interrupt the adversary” [17].  This point in the timeline is 











Figure 3. Representation of an example facility’s physical areas and possible 
adversary paths to a target [17]. 
 
 
Figure 4. Basic adversary sequence diagram for a facility [17]. 
14 
For each adversary path, path element data are used to calculate a delay time, TR, 















1  (2) 
where: 
m = the total number of protection system elements along the path 
k = the point at which the delay time, TR, just exceeds the response force time, TG 
Ti  = the minimum time delay provided by element i 
PNDi  = the nondetection probability provided by element i (that is, the probability that 
element i will not detect the defined adversary), which is the complement of PD  
For example, a nondetection probability of 0.2 means that there is a 20% probability the 
adversary will not be detected; hence there is an 80% probability that the adversary will 
be detected.  Note that the analysis models use the probability of nondetection, while PD 
is the performance measure for detection elements.  Detection at each element is assumed 
to be an independent variable.  PI, the probability of interruption, is the cumulative 
probability of detection for all elements up to theCDP. 
Depending on the target(s) of interest, protection elements, adversary objectives, 
and response tactics, among other things, many adversary paths can be defined for a 
given facility.  The critical path for a system is the path with the lowest PI.  The overall 
system effectiveness, then, is determined by the PI for this critical path: 
NIE PPP ×=  (3) 
where PN is an estimated probability of neutralization, a measure of the response to the 
attack.  Figure 5 illustrates an example adversary event timeline.  In this example, the 
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adversary must penetrate two protection layers, the portal and the vault wall, to reach the 
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Figure 5.  Example adversary event timeline [32]. 
The actual path analysis for a facility can prove to be complex given the range of 
targets, objectives, protection elements, and path combinations that must be considered.  
Several tools have been developed to automate the pat  analysis.  The EASI (Estimate of 
Adversary Sequence Interruption) approach to physical security evaluation [33] was 
developed to be executed on a hand-held calculator.  Currently, a Microsoft® Excel 
spreadsheet template is available to implement EASI [17].  SAVI (Systematic Analysis of 
Vulnerability to Intrusion) is another modeling code that provides a comprehensive 
analysis of adversary paths into a facility [34].  The ASSESS (Analytical System and 
Software for Evaluating Safeguards and Security) software includes modules and a 
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baseline performance database to characterize the PPS elements of a facility as well as 
perform the path analysis calculations [35].  The ATL S (Adversary Time-Line Analysis 
System) software [36] uses the same models as ASSES, extends some of those 
capabilities in the Facility and Outsider assessment modules, and provides updated 
graphics, computational algorithms, and documentation capabilities.  ATLAS, however, 
does not yet include a complete capability for insider analysis. 
The risk equations associated with the calculation of system effectiveness are 
defined as follows [17].  First, the risk is defined in terms of the probability of an attack 
occurring (PA), the probability of success of the attack (PS), and the consequences (C) of 
the attack: 
CPPR SA ××=  (4) 
Because of the difficulties and uncertainties in determining probabilities of adversary 
attacks, the conditional risk (RC) was adopted, that is, RC is conditional on an attack 
occurring.  In addition, using the complement of the probability of an adversary attack in 
terms of the system effectiveness gives: 
CPR EC ×−= )1(  (5) 
Once the system effectiveness has been determined, th  overall conditional risk can be 
determined incorporating consequences of the adversary attack for the critical path. 
2.3 INSIDER STUDIES AND EVALUATION OF INSIDER THREATS 
Insiders are the most capable of security threats to any organization.  An insider is 
defined as anyone with knowledge of, access to, and authority at a facility [17].  This 
definition implies that every employee in an organiz tion is an insider, and any employee 
may pose an insider threat.  For facilities that have security systems in place to protect 
critical assets, insiders have access “inside” the protective measures.  In addition, 
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contractors, suppliers, vendors, visitors, and others who are not direct employees of an 
organization may also be considered a part of the population that has access inside an 
organization and pose an insider threat.  Of concern is a malicious insider who might 
attempt theft of critical assets, sabotage of equipment or operations, or other criminal 
activities.  The insider threat is a critical concern because successful attacks at secure 
facilities almost always require the participation of a willing insider.   
For theft or diversion of material, malicious insiders are formidable threats 
because they have knowledge of operations and access to critical areas where target 
materials may be located.  They can take advantage of abnormal conditions (e.g., alarms) 
or opportunities that arise to circumvent system elem nts and to access a target directly 
without being detected.  Detection and delay timelines are not as relevant because 
insiders can choose the most opportune times and optimum strategies, often using 
protracted or discontinuous attacks.  One strategy for addressing the insider threat would 
be to optimize the control and accountability of materi ls, and to more fully incorporate 
MC&A elements into the evaluation of the S&S protection system. 
Analysis of and protection against insider threats [37-41] can be challenging 
because insiders have knowledge of operations and opportunity to access critical areas.  
They can exploit this knowledge, opportunity and access to plan and implement an 
attack.  They are willing to abuse their access to handle material or monitor alarms.  
Insider studies demonstrate that property theft is prevalent, and a majority of incidents 
involve a single insider or insiders in collusion, in many cases with outsiders [37-39].   
Malevolent insiders may be internally motivated or externally coerced [32].  
Figure 6 illustrates characterization of malevolent insiders.  Categories of malevolent 
insiders include “passive” individuals who are willing only to provide information or 
“active” individuals who will facilitate access or bypass or disable equipment.  Active, 
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non-violent individuals actively participate in the attack, but are unwilling to use force, 
while active, violent individuals are willing to use force to achieve their goals.  All 
malevolent insiders use stealth and deceit and do not want to have their activities 
detected.  They may also be rational or irrational; an irrational insider may not seem to 









Figure 6.   Categories of malevolent insiders. 
2.3.1 Insider Analysis with the Current Path Analysis Methodology 
The path analysis described in Section 2.2 for an outsider threat can also be used 
for the active, violent insider threat.  Variations of this analysis, quantitative and 
qualitative, are used for various other types of insider threats.  For insider attacks, 
detection and delay timelines are not as relevant because insiders can choose the most 
opportune times and optimum strategies, often using protracted and discontinuous 
attacks.  In the case of Equation 2 above, determining the probability of detection can be 
difficult for insider attack scenarios.  In many cases, qualitative information about the 
level of access, knowledge, detection likelihoods, and the resulting effectiveness are rated 
as low, medium, or high.  In other cases, subject matter experts can be used to estimate 
quantitative detection probabilities.   
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Generally, for an insider, PI is the probability of detection, so, from Equation 3: 
NDE PPP ×=  (6)  
where: 
PD  = conditional probability of detection given that both sensing and assessing the 
adversary have occurred 
PN  = conditional probability of neutralization by the response force given that the 
attack has been interrupted 
In the case of the passive or active nonviolent insider, the adversary does not put 
up a fight, so the threat is neutralized as soon as detection occurs – PN  is certain, that is 
equal to 1, so, 
DE PP =  (7) 
While the insider analysis method does provide an analysis of the insider threat 
within the framework for evaluating the effectiveness of the PPS, it does not specifically 
address the effectiveness of the MC&A component of an S&S protection system. 
2.3.2 Other Insider Assessment Methods 
In the late 1970s, the U.S. DOE developed and used the Diversion Path Analysis 
(DPA) methodology [42] specifically to evaluate the capability of the MC&A subsystem 
to detect the diversion of nuclear material by a knowledgeable insider.  The methodology 
used an iterative process to analyze general diversion paths for each material in each 
process area of a facility to derive a relative path weight based on attributes of the 
diversion path.  The relative path weight is a measure of the complexity of the path rather 
than a measure of the probability that the insider will chose that path.  Of concern was 
theft of amounts of material attractive for making a crude nuclear explosive device.  
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Theft of other types and quantities of nuclear materi l and performance of the PPS were 
not addressed by the DPA.   
The Insider Safeguards Effectiveness Model is another model developed in the 
late 1970s [43] to evaluate the effectiveness of a facility’s safeguards against a group of 
insiders attempting theft or sabotage.  The model requi es user input, which in most cases 
is very subjective.  Safeguards Evaluation Tool (ET) [44] was another methodology and 
computer tool that was developed as part of the subsequent Safeguards Evaluation 
Method for nonviolent insider adversaries.  The path analysis tools described in Section 
2.2 (EASI, SAVI, and ASSESS) have also been applied to insider analyses, specifically 
for a non-violent insider adversary on an exit path from the facility.     
2.3.3 Material Assurance Indicator Algorithm Development 
Prior to the work of Dawson and Hester [6, 7], no measures or standards for 
comparison were defined to determine whether a protecti n system provided effective 
control of nuclear materials, that is, the effectiveness of an MC&A system.  The 
development of the MAI for evaluating the MC&A activi ies involved in protecting 
nuclear materials has shown promise for providing this ype of metric [6, 7].  A perfect 
materials control system would ensure that all the attributes and each location of 
materials in a system are known all the time.  In the case of evaluating the MC&A 
component of an S&S system, the materials information would be evaluated within the 
timeline for an adversary attack.  The MAI algorithm computes an MAI on a per-item 
basis and indicates material assurance at any given t me.  Items can be defined as the 
container of a group of items or the physical containment of multiple items, such as a 
vault configuration.  The two-part formulation accounts for the attributes, locations, and 



















MAI  =  Material Assurance Indicator – the metric for assessed detection 
MCF  =  Material Characterization Factor – what is the i em to be protected 
HR  =  Handling – where the item is located 
AR  =  Attribute Monitoring – where the item is located 
RR  =  Gamma/Neutron Monitoring – where the item is located 
LF  =  Latency Factor – when the material was last handled or monitored 
∆t  =  Critical time – based on protection strategies 
t  =  Time when the last handling/monitoring occurred, subtracted from ∆t  
N = Number of items defined 
Values for MCF, handling, and monitoring are determined by relative rankings of 
various MC&A procedures and technologies, on a scale of [0, 1], yielding an overall 
measure between [0, 1].  The relative ranking is determined by subject-matter experts and 
verified through experimental results.  An informal elicitation was used to determine an 
initial set of values for initial algorithm development and testing. 
The algorithm was tested for four different scenarios at hypothetical facilities:  to 
use real-time information on an item basis to improve decision making on response 
methods, to track unauthorized movement of material and heighten alert to increase PI, to 
determine the frequency of a physical inventory given the failure probability of sensors in 
a monitoring system, and to address the performance of MC&A protections.  The initial 
testing demonstrated that the algorithm shows promising capabilities to provide positive 
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responses for each of the four scenarios.  Also, early in the development of the MAI 
algorithm, it became apparent that activities at an item level could be considered a type of 
sensor system, with both alarm and assessment capabilities that are necessary for 
detection.  The MAI algorithm can also evaluate MC&A system capability to provide 
detection of an active non-violent insider attempting theft or diversion of nuclear 
material. 
The algorithm is currently formulated as a deterministic point estimate for an 
individual item or group of items, separate from the path analysis methods for 
determining system effectiveness of a PPS.  A probabilistic analogue for the MAI will 
enable security analysts to explicitly incorporate MC&A protections into the PE 
calculations performed for the existing probabilistic path analysis methodology to 
provide an effectiveness measure of both the physical protection and MC&A systems to 
address outsider and insider threats.  
2.4 RISK ASSESSMENT TOOLS 
Given the techniques used in the probabilistic path analysis methodology, it is 
reasonable to investigate other applications of PRA that may be applicable to the 
development of a probabilistic analogue for the MAI.  Since the WASH-1400 study [45], 
PRA methods have been developed for and applied to for the assessment of nuclear 
power plant safety.  A summary of these methods for the subsequent severe accident risk 
study (NUREG-1150) is provided in Breeding, et al. [46]; the South Texas Project 
nuclear power plant also describes the details of PRA methods [47].  In the early 1990s, 
the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) develop d and adopted in 1995 a policy 
statement regarding the expanded use of PRA and associ ted analyses [48] that has led to 
a wider implementation of risk-informed decision-making.  PRA techniques have also 
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been widely applied in the chemical processing, aerospace, aviation, and maritime safety 
industries [49-52].   
More recent work has applied PRA approaches to the evaluation of proliferation 
resistance evaluation [53-56].  These efforts have employed a Markov modeling approach 
for proliferation resistance in advanced fuel cycles consistent with the evaluation 
framework being developed by the Proliferation Resistance and Physical Protection 
Expert Group of the Generation IV International Forum [57].  The initial efforts [53, 54] 
investigated the application of a Markov chain method to perform detailed proliferation 
scenario and pathway analysis and to quantify measur s of proliferation resistance, 
including proliferation success, probability of detecting proliferation, technical difficulty, 
and proliferation time.  Analyses have been performed for misuse, diversion from the 
front-end and back end of the fuel cycle, and abrogati n scenarios for an advanced light-
water reactor [53, 54], different reprocessing facilities [53], and an example sodium fast 
reactor [53, 55].  The Markov chain method has the capability to account for some of the 
dynamic features of proliferation, including the large number of uncertainties, the 
unpredictability of human performance, and the effect of changing conditions with time 
[54, 56].  More recently, safeguards approaches, fal e larms, concealment, and human 
performance have been incorporated in the Markov modeling [54], and four different fuel 
cycle arrangements have been analyzed to determine proliferation success and 
proliferation risk, where consequence is represented by a material type index [56].  The 
proliferation resistance problem has many similar characteristics to insider theft.  The 
Markov models described in these papers, however, ar  continuous-time models that are 
solved as a system of continuous differential equations in time.  With this solution 
approach, hard delays that are characteristic of discontinuous insider theft scenarios 
would be difficult to model.  In addition, the Markov modeling approach is less 
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compatible than other approaches to the existing path analysis methods used to evaluation 
system effectiveness of a PPS.    
Other recent work has applied PRA techniques to develop a fault tree for a 
functional MC&A model, including basic event probabilities determined by a Delphi 
expert judgment process to evaluate MC&A effectiveness and relative risk calculations 
performed using PRA software [58-62].  The functional model for the MC&A System 
Effectiveness Tool (MSET) details 144 fundamental elements of a comprehensive 
MC&A system, including key functions to deter, detect, and mitigate potential insider 
threats [59, 60].  Quantitative values for the basic event probabilities are converted from 
qualitative responses to a survey questionnaire about MC&A elements at a facility [60] 
using a Delphi process to combine values provided by multiple experts.  The fault tree, 
based on the functional model, along with basic event probabilities indicative of 
“operational quality” derived by experts are used to assess the basic reliability of the 
MC&A system at a nuclear facility [59].  The result of the PRA calculations using the 
fault tree provide relative risk measures, and an estimate of the overall failure probability 
“to maintain nuclear material under the purview” of the MC&A system [59].  Addressing 
the insider threat using the MSET model has been explored by examining “those 
elements, which based on expert judgment, are most attractive to and vulnerable to 
insiders,” [59] but determination of detection probabilities, analysis of insider theft 
scenarios analyses, or integration with PPS elements are not addressed.   
Of the many applications of PRA that were investigated, the techniques that were 
identified to support the probabilistic basis for incorporating MC&A protections into the 
existing path analysis methodology include techniques for variable event sequence 
ordering and HRA techniques for determining detection probabilities for MC&A 
activities. 
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2.4.1 Techniques for Variable Event Sequence Ordering 
The path analysis performed to evaluate a PPS can be represented by a traditional 
PRA event tree with binary branching for detection a d non-detection through each 
protection element of an adversary’s path.  To incorporate MC&A activities that may be 
characterized as having recurring “detection” opportunities, techniques for variable event 
ordering need to be applied.  The Object-based Event S quence Tree methodology [63] 
combines the best features of traditional event tree analysis and Monte Carlo-based event 
simulation with concepts from object-oriented analysis into a PRA technique that easily 
supports recurring or variable event ordering.  Developing an object model provides a 
framework for characterizing insider theft scenarios that include recurring MC&A 
activities.  The set of possible scenarios to be evaluated can be deduced by analyzing the 
object model as an event sequence diagram (ESD) that extends the traditional event tree 
representation of insider theft to include MC&A activities.  ESDs are another PRA 
technique that are used to represent the variability and uncertainty of events in accident 
scenarios analyzed for safety analyses of space craft launches [50].  
2.4.2 Human Reliability Analysis Techniques 
Since the early 1970s, HRA has been considered to be an integral part of PRA for 
a nuclear power plant (NPP).  Human performance in NPP operations continues to be an 
important element for reactor safety.  Swain and Guttmann [64] developed a handbook 
that includes methods, models, and estimated human error probabilities (HEPs) to 
address human performance of operations for PRA of an NPP.  The methods in the 
handbook describe various approaches for representing human error in a PRA.  The 
frameworks for incorporating HRA in a PRA has evolved from Swain’s and Guttmann’s 
Technique for Human Error Rate Prediction [64] that considers how performance shaping 
factors (stress, workload, training) influence the occurrence and type of human error 
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mechanisms to more multi-disciplinary approaches that more fully consider the how 
human factors, behavioral science and plant engineering contribute to plant conditions 
that influence not only performance shaping factors, but also specific error mechanisms 
and unsafe actions (“errors of commission”) that contribute to accidents [65, 66].  
Most applicable to establishing a probabilistic basis for incorporating MC&A 
activities with physical protection are Swain’s and Guttmann’s methods for checking 
operations as recovery factors.  A recovery factor is defined as “an element of an NPP 
system that acts to prevent deviant conditions from producing unwanted effects” [64, p. 
19-1].  Human redundancy is a type of recovery factor that occurs when one person 
checks his or her own work or another person’s work, detects an error that has occurred 
and corrects it.  The handbook describes a variety of checking operations used in an NPP.  
Some may involve checking routine tasks that recur on a regular basis performed by the 
same or different persons with or without a written checklist.  Others may involve one 
person checking another person’s work; special short-term, one-of-a-kind checking with 
alert factors; or special measurement tasks.  HRA methods for evaluating operator 
attention to unannuciated alarm signals during nuclear power plant operations also 
provide insights for addressing MC&A activities.  These methods also show how the 
effectiveness of repeated inspections decreases over time if an anomalous condition is not 
recognized the first time it occurs. 
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Chapter 3:  Methods for Extended Path Analysis – One Daily MC&A 
Activity in One Physical Protection Layer 
This work focused on a new method to incorporate MC&A protection elements 
within the existing probabilistic path analysis methodology to estimate PE for insider 
threats.  The approaches taken to complete this work included: 
• The use of available path analysis modeling techniques 
• The characterization of MC&A activities 
• The investigation of safety PRA methods as the basis for possible applicable 
analogues 
• The use of applicable statistical analysis techniques to investigate the 
development of detection distributions for MC&A elem nts 
• The development of data sets for representative hypot etical facilities 
• The use of available path analysis modeling and computational tools to 
demonstrate comparative PE calculations  
Three important insights resulted from the initial investigation of MC&A 
protection elements.  These insights and how these might be incorporated in existing path 
analysis modeling techniques include: 
1. MC&A protection elements are interwoven within each physical protection layer, 
and provide additional detection and delay opportunities within the S&S system.  
In their MAI work, Dawson and Hester [6, 7] observed that many MC&A 
activities provide sensing and detection capabilities, similar to other sensors in a 
PPS.  In addition, MC&A activities that discourage insiders provide many, often 
recurring opportunities to determine the status of critical items (for example, daily 
administrative checks).   
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2. MC&A protection elements can act as a “switch” that changes the state of the 
facility from normal operation to one of heightened alert when material is 
discovered “missing.” 
3. Insider theft can be characterized as a “race” betwe n insider theft stages that 
move target material from internal to external physical protection layers and the 
MC&A protection elements that detect that material is not where it should be. 
These insights along with the identified PRA techniques provided a basis for 
characterizing MC&A activities in a way that is compatible with the existing path 
analysis methodology. 
3.1 OBJECT-BASED PARADIGM FOR INSIDER THEFT  
Considering the insights and observations about MC&A protection elements as 
well as the characteristic differences with respect to delay and detection timelines for 
insider scenarios and the relationship to protection layers, an object-oriented modeling 
approach [63] was applied to develop an object-based tate machine paradigm to 
characterize insider theft scenarios.  An example of such an object-based state machine is 
shown in Figures 7a and 7b.  The “system” is characte ized by two objects:  an Insider 
Theft object and a Facility Status object.  The figures illustrate the state transition 
diagrams for each object:  the Insider Theft object (7a) and the Facility Status object (7b) 
and their interrelation.  Each box in the diagrams is a possible “state” of the object at a 
given point in time.  The arcs between each state are events that can occur to move the 
object from one state to another.   
The Insider Theft object generally describes the possible steps in a specific insider 























































Figure 7b.   State transition diagram for Facility Status Object. 
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1. defeat safeguards at the target to obtain the material,  
2. defeat safeguards in the material access area (MAA), and move the material 
through the protected area (PA), 
3. defeat safeguards in the PA and move material through the facility boundary, 
and then 
4. defeat safeguards at the facility boundary and move the material out of the 
facility.   
The Facility object indicates how MC&A protection elements act as a “switch” that 
changes the state of the facility from normal to heig tened alert when the facility is 
searching for material that is discovered “missing.”   
This model is specifically constructed for each attack scenario, and the defined 
states and state transitions will vary as appropriate to the modeled scenario.  The 
analytical examples presented in this work end at the state where material is out of the 
facility, although modeling additional steps in the attack is also possible.  This approach 
characterizes insider theft as a “race” between insider theft stages from internal to 
external physical protection layers and the MC&A system elements that detect that the 
material is not where it should be.  This characterization of an insider theft is similar to 
the characterization of an outsider attack for the PPS as a race between the adversary and 
facility response team after detection has occurred.   
This modeling approach was used to develop an overall understanding of the 
insider theft and its relationship to the facility state.  This state machine could be modeled 
using discrete event simulation methods that would provide relative probabilities of the 
final end-states of all possible scenarios.  In this work, however, it was important to 
model, in detail, the intermediate steps of the insider theft scenarios to investigate the 
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importance of each MC&A activity and PPS element in detecting the insider theft 
actions. 
3.2 INCORPORATING AN ASSESSMENT OF MC&A  ACTIVITIES  
Event trees are often used in evaluating PPS scenarios, but are difficult to use here 
because traditional event trees do not show dependency among events in a way that is 
easily summarized by the analyst for a reviewer.  Characterizing the protection system to 
include MC&A elements interwoven within each physical protection layer provides a 
basis for extending the traditional event tree representation with detection or no detection 
of insider theft through the PPS (Figure 8) to include MC&A activities.  The set of 
possible scenarios to be evaluated can be deduced by analyzing the object model as an 
ESD that incorporates MC&A detection with PPS detection.  Figure 9 illustrates this 
extension as an ESD where detection by MC&A (yellow boxes) and PPS protection 
elements (white boxes) are considered in each protecti n layer.  The ESD allows a more 
detailed representation of the steps of insider theft, the incorporation of MC&A activities 
within each layer, and event sequence progression for the differing facility state 
conditions of normal or heightened alert.  The ESD also provides a framework for 
propagating probability values to determine effectiveness for detecting missing material.  
Figure 9 indicates where MC&A activities trigger a change of facility state from normal 
to “heightened alert,” when the facility is searching for material that is unaccounted for 
and may be missing.  This state change is modeled using different PPS detection 
probabilities for the normal and heightened alert facility states at each detection 
opportunity.  Detection probabilities for a “Normal” facility state can be enhanced if an 
MC&A alert has occurred and the facility state is “Searching for Missing Material.”  
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Figure 9.   Insider theft modeled as an event sequence diagram (ESD) incorporating 
MC&A. 
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detecting and finding the material, and the adversary has a lower probability of 
successfully removing the material from a physical protection layer. 
3.3 INSIDER THEFT AND MC&A  DETECTION TIMELINES  
One of the challenges for evaluating the effectiveness of an S&S protection 
system against an insider adversary is that the detction and delay timelines determined 
for the outside adversary and the PPS are not as relevant because an insider adversary can 
choose the most opportune time to take advantage of system vulnerabilities.  The various 
theft events may be separated by large gaps in time (discontinuous or protracted theft).  
The object-based state machine provides a framework for representing the time of 
occurrence for each step in the theft as well as the MC&A detection time that changes the 
facility state as probability distributions.  Determining whether theft or detection occurs 
first, that is who wins the race, is accomplished by convolution of the theft and detection 
distributions for each scenario. 
Time variables are defined for the insider theft timeline and the MC&A detection 
timeline.  As an insider theft is initiated and proceeds through the physical protection 
layers of a facility, the insider theft timeline is defined by two (or more) time variables: 
TR1  – Part of the insider theft timeline that represent  the time for the adversary to 
successfully remove target material from Physical Protection Layer 1.  The 
time interval begins when the adversary obtains the material and ends when 
the adversary removes target material from Physical Protection Layer 1. 
TRi  – Part of the insider theft timeline that represent  the time for the adversary to 
successfully remove target material from the ith Physical Protection Layer.  
The time interval begins when TR(n-1) ends and ends when the adversary 
removes the target material from the ith Physical Protection Layer for layers 
2 through n. 
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Additional time variables are defined as needed for each stage of an insider theft through 
additional physical protection layers.  Each of these times is represented as a probability 
distribution in order to represent the variation in both the time before a removal 
opportunity presents itself and the time to accomplish the removal task.  The distributions 
for the adversary theft timeline [P(TR1), P(TRi), …, P(TRn)] depend on the defeat methods 
available to an adversary (e.g., removal through an SNM monitor after disabling the 
monitor) and when the adversary may take advantage of opportunities to exploit system 
vulnerabilities or to circumvent protection elements. 
The MC&A detection timeline is defined by the detection opportunities provided 
by MC&A activities as they are performed in each physical protection layer and is 
defined as: 
TMC&AAlert  – The time when MC&A activities may indicate that target material is 
missing.  The time interval begins when theft occurs and ends when MC&A 
alert occurs. 
TMC&AAlert  is the time when the Facility state transitions from the “Normal” state to the 
“Searching for Missing Material” state (Alert).  Times and associated probabilities 
[P(TMC&AAlert )] are dependent on specific MC&A activities included in a scenario.  The 
distribution for the MC&A detection timeline can be developed considering specific 
MC&A activities and associated operational considerations of when and how these 
activities are performed.  In a well-designed MC&A and security system, TMC&AAlert  << 
TRn to allow for the maximum opportunity to interdict the adversary and stop the theft.  If 
TMC&AAlert  > TRn, then the material has been stolen before the facility is even aware that it 
is missing. 
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3.4 CONVOLUTION INTEGRAL 1 
MC&A activities contribute to the effectiveness of the facility protection system 
by providing alerts that material may be missing.  The effectiveness of MC&A activities 
can be determined by comparing the probability distribu ions for the time for MC&A 
alerts [TMC&AAlert  ] with the probability distributions for the time for removal of material 
by the adversary [TR1, TRi, …, TRn] using probabilistic convolution to determine the 
probability that detection occurs before theft.  As presented in Appendix A, convolution 
is a method of combining probability distributions that has been used in nuclear power 
plant PRA [47] and security timeline analyses [33].   
As a general example considering removal of material, let TM and TR be random 
variables over time, where TM is the timing for MC&A alerts and TR is timing for insider 
theft (removal of material).  Let tM and tR be specific values of these random variables.  
The range of TM and TR is [0, ∞).  
Let P(tM) denote the probability density function for TM and let P(tR) denote the 
probability density function for TR.  Let P(tM, tR) denote the joint probability density 
function for TM and TR.  
A random variable for time of possible “detection” is defined as TD = TM - TR and 
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The range of TD is [-∞, ∞].  The probability that TD is less than zero is: 
                                               
1  The formulation for convolution of insider theft and MC&A detection was developed with the assistance 
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This is the probability that an MC&A alert occurs and the Facility transitions from the 
“Normal” state to the “Searching for Missing Material” state before the insider is 
successful in moving the material past that physical protection layer. 
3.5 HUMAN RELIABILITY MODELS FOR MC&A  ACTIVITIES  
The characterization of MC&A activities as having detection capabilities was a 
first step for incorporating MC&A activities as additional sensors in a site’s protection 
system.  In addition, a probabilistic basis is needed to determine an appropriate 
probability of detection (PD) for MC&A protection elements.  HRA methods of Swain 
and Guttmann [64], specifically NPP checking operations as recovery factors and the 
associated HEPs, were applied as a basis to probabilistically characterize MC&A 
detection. 
3.5.1 MC&A Activities as NPP Checking Operations 
MC&A activities have many similar characteristics to operator tasks performed in 
an NPP in that the reliability of these activities depends significantly on human 
performance.  Many of the procedures involve human performance in checking for 
anomalous conditions.  As an example, checking the status of a valve in an NPP is similar 
to checking the status of a nuclear material target in a vault.  The respective associated 
anomalous conditions are that a valve should be closed but is partially or completely open 
(perhaps after a maintenance activity), and that a t rget in a vault is not where it should 
be located.  Both can be characterized as checking procedures, in which an identified 
checking opportunity exists, and a person discovers or fails to discover an anomalous 
condition.  Further characterization of MC&A activies as procedures that check the 
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status of critical assets provides a basis for applying HRA models and methods to 
determine probabilities of detection for MC&A protec ion elements – the probability of 
detection is defined as the complement of the HEP for performing an operation.   
Table 1 identifies typical MC&A activities and similar characteristics of operator 
tasks identified by Swain and Guttman [64 Table 19-1].  The table also includes an 
estimated baseline HEP (BHEP) associated with the NPP operator tasks as determined by 
the HRA work of Swain and Guttman [64].  These estima ed BHEPs can be applied to 
MC&A protection elements by using the complement as a probability of detection for a 
given MC&A activity. 
3.5.2 Dependence Models for Recurring MC&A Activities 
Within a PPS, sensor elements are designed to detect unauthorized activity.  This 
work has provided additional insights to characterize MC&A activities as additional 
sensors within a site’s protection system.  MC&A activities are interwoven within each 
protection layer of the PPS and provide additional detection and delay opportunities 
within the S&S protection system.  These activities are important protection elements 
against insider theft and can serve to discourage malicious insider activity.  They provide 
many, often recurring opportunities to determine th status of critical items (for example, 
daily administrative checks).  As an example, Table 2 lists some key administrative 
MC&A activities that are performed on a recurring basis.  A year-long detection 
opportunity timeline can be constructed from the compilation of the recurrence of these 
activities, which demonstrates the importance of these activities as protection elements 
against insider threats. 
In this work, MC&A activities have been characterizd as a type of human 
redundancy recovery factor.  Generally, MC&A activities would be considered 
independent events.  However, because many of the MC&A activities are recurring, it is  
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Table 1: Characterization of MC&A activities as different types of NPP checking 
operations with estimated probabilities (HEPs) thata checker will fail to 
detect an error (columns 2 and 3 from [64, Table 19-1]) 
MC&A Activity Nuclear Power Plant Checking Operation BHEP 
Plan of the Day Checking routine tasks using written materials 0.10 
Material Measurement Checking that involves active participation, such as 
special measurements 
0.01 
Forms Reconciliation Special short-term, one-of-a-kind checking with 
alerting factors 
0.05 
Process Call Special short-term, one-of-a-kind checking with 
alerting factors 
0.05 
Material Request Checking routine tasks using written materials 0.10 
Material Transfer Checking by reader/checker of the task performer in 
a two-man team, or checking by a second checker, 
routine task 
0.50 
Product Storage  Checking by reader/checker of the task performer in 
a two-man team, or checking by a second checker, 
routine task 
0.50 
Daily Administrative Check Checking routine tasks using written materials 0.10 
Physical Inventory Checking that involves active participation, such as 
special measurements 
0.01 
Inventory Audit Checking that involves active participation, such as 
special measurements 
0.01 
Table 2:   Frequencies of key administrative MC&A activities (representative) 
MC&A Activity 





Plan of the Day 1 
Daily Administrative Check 1 
Forms Reconciliation 3 
Process Call 15 
Physical Inventory 30 
Inventory Audit 365 
important to consider and understand the dependence between the recurrences of the 
same activity or between the occurrences of two different activities and whether they are 
performed by the same or different persons.  Dependence is a characteristic used in HRA 
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methods to consider how the success or failure of asubsequent task depends on the 
success or failure of the immediately preceding task.   
The failure to address the issue of dependence “may le d to an optimistic 
assessment of joint HEPs for NPP tasks” [64, p. 10-1].  One method for assessing 
dependence is a positive dependence model for estimating conditional probabilities for 
two tasks.  Positive dependence implies a positive relationship between events, that is 
“…failure on the first task increases the probability of failure on the second task” [64, p. 
10-4].  The positive dependence model can be applied in situations where actual data on 
conditional probabilities of success or failure in the performance of tasks is not available. 
Equation 15 provides the failure equation that is used to calculate conditional 
probabilities of failure on Task M given failure on the previous Task M-1 for different 







FFP MMM  (15) 
where a ranges from 0 to ∞.  Values of a equal to 0, 1, 6, 19, and correspond, 
respectively, to points of complete, high, moderate, low, and zero positive dependence 
[64, Equations 10-14 through 10-18].  
To explore the dependence that may be generally associ ted with recurring 
MC&A activities, the failure equation for the positive dependence model from Swain and 
Guttmann [64] was applied for one MC&A activity tha occurs once per day over a 30-
day period.  Figures 10, 11, and 12 show how the daily probability of MC&A detection 
varies across five different levels of dependence for a low (0.02), medium (0.50), and 
high (0.99) initial probability of detection (complement of a BHEP for a type of NPP 
operation associated with a specific MC&A activity).  These plots demonstrate how, in 
most cases of human performance, it is expected that w en a person performs a recurring 
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activity, if he or she does not detect an anomaly in the first one or two opportunities, then 
the likelihood that the anomaly will be detected will decrease significantly for subsequent 
opportunities.  Generally, with recurring activities, each subsequent opportunity has a 
decreasing likelihood of successfully detecting an anomaly given that the previous 
opportunity has failed.  With no dependence between r curring MC&A activities (for 
example, a different person performing the operation f r each recurrence), the initial 
probability of detection can be maintained over the 30-day timeline.  The decrease in 
probability of detection for each subsequent recurrence of the same activity or of two 
activities, however, will vary with the level of dep ndence between the recurrences of the 
activities, as shown in Figures 10, 11, and 12.  The plots differ only in the scale on the y-
axis, which reflects the low, medium and high values, respectively, for the initial 










































Figure 10:   Daily probability of detection over a 30-day period for one MC&A activity 
performed once a day based on a BHEP of 0.98, or aninitial probability of 











































Figure 11:   Daily probability of detection over a 30-day period for one MC&A activity 
performed once a day based on a BHEP of 0.50, or aninitial probability of 














































Figure 12:   Daily probability of detection over a 30-day period for one MC&A activity 
performed once a day based on a BHEP of 0.01, or aninitial probability of 
detection of 0.99, for the five different levels of dependence. 
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3.6 TIMELY DETECTION  
The existing path analysis methodology evaluates th PPS for a facility on the 
basis of detection, delay and response timelines using probabilistic analysis of adversary 
paths to determine a quantitative probabilistic measure of timely detection.  The path 
analysis methodology calculates the probability PE that the PPS achieves timely detection 
and is effective in defeating an attack by an outside adversary.  This work has developed 
several elements to provide a probabilistic basis for extending the existing path analysis 
methodology to incorporate timely MC&A detection.   
MC&A activities contribute to the effectiveness of the facility protection system 
by providing alerts that material may be missing.  While timely detection for a PPS 
depends on detection, delay and response that interrup s and neutralizes an attack from an 
outside adversary, timely detection for MC&A activities depends on detecting that 
material is not where it should be and providing an alert.  The mathematics for 
probabilistic convolution provide a basis to determine the probability that an MC&A alert 
(detection) causes the Facility to transition to the “Searching for Missing Material” state 
before the insider moves the material past a given physical protection layer.  The 
effectiveness of MC&A activities can be determined by convolving the probability 
distributions for the MC&A detection timeline with e insider theft timeline to determine 
the probability that detection occurs before the theft of material can be completed.   
3.6.1 Formulation of Timely MC&A Detection 
In demonstrating the application of HRA methods for determining a probability of 
detection for MC&A activities (Section 3.5.2), only the daily MC&A detection timeline, 
specifically for a 30-day scenario, was described without considering the insider 
adversary theft stages.  To determine timely detection, the MC&A detection timeline 
must be convolved with the insider adversary theft timeline.  MC&A activities provide 
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recurring opportunities to detect that material is “missing” such that the facility state 
transition occurs from normal state to alert state.  B cause MC&A activities are usually 
discrete observations, discrete mathematics and discrete probability distributions are 
appropriate.  Because the frequency of recurrence for MC&A activities (Table 2) is 
determined in days, this formulation used one day as the discretization time step.  Other 
discretization time steps could also be used (if appro riate) based on the frequency of 
MC&A activities or theft opportunities.  If material is detected as missing on day n and 
the material has not been removed from the facility before day n, then detection will be 
timely.  To formulate the probability of timely detection by MC&A activities, PD,Timely  is 








,,,  (16) 
This is the sum of MC&A detection that occurs exactly on day n and is timely, that is, 
detection happens before the insider moves the material out of a physical protection layer.  
PD,Timely,n, the probability of timely detection on a given day n, is defined as: 
NTnDEnnTimelyD PPP ×=,,  (17) 
where: 
PDEn  =  the probability that the facility detects material is missing on exactly day n 
PNTn  =  the probability that the material has not been r moved from the facility 
before day n 










TiNTn PP  (18) 
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PTn is the daily probability of theft and is determined from the theft opportunity timeline.  
For example, if an insider has an opportunity to take material once a day over a 30-day 
time period, then   
033.0
30
1 ==TnP           (19) 
PTn is determined for various timeline scenarios based on the type of insider and his or 
her access to the target material. 
Further, because detection on exactly day n implies that the material has not been 
detected as missing before day n and is detected as missing onday n, PDEn is defined as: 
1,,&, −×= nNDnAMCDDEn PPP  (20) 
where: 
PD, MC&A,n  =  the probability of detection for the MC&A activi es on the nth day 
PND,n-1  =  the probability that the material has not been d tected as missing before 
day n 
The detection probabilities for MC&A activities can be determined as described 
in Section 3.6.2 by characterizing individual activities as associated NPP operations and 
defining applicable BHEPs and dependency relationships.  The MC&A detection 
probabilities are the complements of the BHEPs.  AnMC&A detection timeline for a 
given scenario is defined as the set of MC&A activities that are performed on a day-to-
day basis. 
PND,n-1, the probability that the material has not been detect d as missing before 
day n, is defined as: 
nDnND PP <− −= 11,                (21) 
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PD<n is the cumulative probability that the facility detects material is missing (cumulative 
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3.6.2 Example Calculation of Timely MC&A Detection 
Table 3 provides the values for each of the probabilistic parameters required to 
calculate the probability of timely detection by one MC&A activity performed once a day 
in one physical protection layer over a 30-day time period.  In this scenario, the insider 
adversary’s opportunity to remove target material occurs once every day, and the 
adversary will decide during this time period which day will be most advantageous to 
remove the material from this physical protection layer.  For this scenario, then, the 
insider theft opportunity timeline is defined as a uniform distribution function, so the 
daily probability of theft, PTn, is: 
033.0
30
1 ==TnP           (24) 
Column 1 of Table 3 is the day, n.  Column 2 has the daily values for PNTn, the 
probability that the material has not been removed from the facility before day n, and is 
calculated as the complementary cumulative probability that the theft occurred on day n.  
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Table 3:  Calculation of timely detection over a 30-day scenario for a uniform insider 
theft timeline and one MC&A activity performed once a day based on an 
initial probability of detection of 0.02, for a moderate level of dependence 
Day 
(n) PNTn PD, MC&A,n  PND,n-1 PDEn PD<n 
PD,Timely,n 
(PDEn * PNTn) 
1 1.000 0.020 1.000 0.020 0.020 0.020 
2 0.967 0.017 0.980 0.017 0.037 0.016 
3 0.933 0.015 0.963 0.014 0.051 0.013 
4 0.900 0.013 0.949 0.012 0.063 0.011 
5 0.867 0.011 0.937 0.010 0.073 0.009 
6 0.833 0.009 0.927 0.009 0.082 0.007 
7 0.800 0.008 0.918 0.007 0.089 0.006 
8 0.767 0.007 0.911 0.006 0.095 0.005 
9 0.733 0.006 0.905 0.005 0.100 0.004 
10 0.700 0.005 0.900 0.004 0.105 0.003 
11 0.667 0.004 0.895 0.004 0.109 0.003 
12 0.633 0.004 0.891 0.003 0.112 0.002 
13 0.600 0.003 0.888 0.003 0.115 0.002 
14 0.567 0.003 0.885 0.002 0.117 0.001 
15 0.533 0.002 0.883 0.002 0.119 0.001 
16 0.500 0.002 0.881 0.002 0.121 0.001 
17 0.467 0.002 0.879 0.001 0.122 0.001 
18 0.433 0.001 0.878 0.001 0.124 0.001 
19 0.400 0.001 0.876 0.001 0.125 4.4E-04 
20 0.367 0.001 0.875 0.001 0.126 3.4E-04 
21 0.333 0.001 0.874 0.001 0.127 2.7E-04 
22 0.300 0.001 0.873 0.001 0.127 2.1E-04 
23 0.267 0.001 0.873 0.001 0.128 1.6E-04 
24 0.233 0.001 0.872 0.001 0.128 1.2E-04 
25 0.200 4.9E-04 0.872 4.3E-04 0.129 8.6E-04 
26 0.167 4.2E-04 0.871 3.7E-04 0.129 6.2E-04 
27 0.133 3.6E-04 0.871 3.2E-04 0.129 4.2E-04 
28 0.100 3.1E-04 0.871 2.7E-04 0.130 2.7E-04 
29 0.067 2.7E-04 0.870 2.3E-04 0.130 1.6E-04 
30 0.033 2.3E-04 0.870 2.0E-04 0.130 6.6E-04 
Cumulative Probability of Timely Detection: 0.106 
For the example scenario, one MC&A activity is performed once a day over the 
30-day scenario, with a moderate level of dependence between recurrences and a BHEP 
of 0.98.  Column 3 has the daily MC&A probability of detection that is calculated from 
Equation 15 with a=6 and an initial probability of detection equal to 0.02 (1-BHEP).  As 
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expected from the dependence model, the probability of detection decreases for 
subsequent daily recurrences.  Columns 4 through 7 are calculated as described in Section 
3.6.1. 
The cumulative probability of MC&A detection is calu ated by summing all the 
daily values in Column 7, and this is the value that is used as the event probability for 
timely MC&A detection for the 30-day scenario of one MC&A activity performed in one 
physical protection layer once a day and a uniform insider theft timeline.  For this 
scenario, calculations for the probability of timely MC&A detection were completed for 
the five different levels of dependence, for a low (0.02), medium (0.50), and high (0.99) 
initial probability of detection.  Figures 13, 15, and 17 show the relationship of daily 
probability of timely MC&A detection and dependence for the different initial 
probabilities of detection, respectively.   
Additionally, Figures 14, 16, and 18 show the cumulative probability of detection 
that could be achieved by one daily MC&A activity within one physical protection layer 
over the scenario timeline.  The cumulative probability of detection is the value that is 
used in the ESD for the MC&A detection events in each physical protection layer to 
calculate the overall effectiveness for each adversary path scenario.   
Note that in each case, while the daily probability of timely detection decreases 
with time, the cumulative probability of detection improves significantly over the initial 
individual MC&A probability of detection.  Table 4 summarizes the increase in the 
cumulative probability of detection after 30 days for each of the initial probabilities of 
detection and for each of the five dependence levels.  Because of the multiple daily 
detection opportunities, even an MC&A activity with a low initial probability of 
detection can achieve a significantly higher cumulative detection probability if the 







































Figure 13:   Daily probability of timely detection over a 30-day scenario for one MC&A 
activity performed once a day based on a BHEP of 0.98, or a 0.02 initial 














































Figure 14:   Cumulative probability of timely detection over a 30-day scenario for one 
MC&A activity performed once a day based on a BHEP of 0.98, or a 0.02 








































Figure 15:   Daily probability of timely detection over a 30-day scenario for one MC&A 
activity performed once a day based on a BHEP of 0.50, or a 0.50 initial 














































Figure 16:  Cumulative probability of timely detection over a 30-day scenario for one 
MC&A activity performed once a day based on a BHEP of 0.50, or a 0.50 












































Figure 17:   Daily probability of timely detection over a 30-day scenario for one MC&A 
activity performed once a day based on a BHEP of 0.01, or a 0.99 initial 














































Figure 18:   Cumulative probability of timely detection over a 30-day scenario for one 
MC&A activity performed once a day based on a BHEP of 0.01, or a 0.99 
initial probability of detection, for five different levels of dependence. 
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Table 4: 30-day cumulative probability of MC&A detec ion for five dependence 





Level of Dependence 
Complete High Moderate Low Zero 
0.02 0.020 0.038 0.106 0.180 0.258 
0.50 0.500 0.699 0.939 0.963 0.967 
0.99 0.990 0.997 0.999 0.999 0.999 
 
reduced.  A more than ten-fold increase (0.02 to 0.258) is evident for an activity that has 
0.02 initial probability of detection and zero depend nce between recurrences of MC&A 
observations.  It is evident that even one MC&A activity can provide significant 
additional detection capabilities; this substantiates the importance of MC&A activities to 
protect against suspicious or unauthorized insider activities.  This analysis also points to 
three factors that can be used to “design” MC&A operations so that theft by a 
knowledgeable insider is more difficult:  developing MC&A activities that have low 
BHEPs; reducing the dependency between recurrences of MC&A activities; and 
extending the adversary’s theft timeline.   
3.7 SUMMARY OF METHODS DEVELOPMENT FOR A SINGLE PHYSICAL 
PROTECTION LAYER 
A focus of this research has been to investigate PRA methods that may be 
applicable to the development of a probabilistic approach for characterizing MC&A 
activities and incorporating an evaluation of the MC&A component to provide an overall 
effectiveness measure of the S&S protection system.  The methods in this chapter have 
applied several PRA techniques and describe the modeling and quantification elements 
for insider theft and MC&A characterization.  The mthods have been demonstrated for 
the formulation and calculations of timely MC&A detec ion by one daily MC&A event in 
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a single physical protection layer for a single theft timeline.  The calculation for the 
insider theft timelines and MC&A detection becomes more complex as the number of 
protection layers increases and more MC&A detection activities are considered.  This 
will be illustrated in analyses that follow in the n xt chapter for several scenarios with 
different theft and MC&A detection timelines and multiple protection layers. 
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Chapter 4: Methods for Extended Path Analysis – Daily and Combined 
MC&A Detection and Multiple Physical Protection Layers 
To demonstrate the extended path analysis methods beyond a single daily MC&A 
activity in a single physical protection layer, additional methods development was 
required.  The calculation for the insider theft timelines and MC&A detection become 
more complex as the number of protection layers increases and more MC&A detection 
activities are considered.  Methods are required for pr babilistic inference to determine 
values of timely MC&A detection in subsequent physical protection layers and for 
composite timelines determined from the timelines for each physical protection layer.   
Calculations were completed for several combinations of timelines for multiple 
protection layers, with both uniform and variable th f  timeline distributions, including a 
geometric distribution developed using Latin Hypercube Sampling (LHS).  In addition, 
probability of detection calculations for sets of MC&A activities that occur at different 
time intervals were completed.  
To facilitate this phase of methods development, insider theft scenarios were 
developed for a hypothetical facility.2  An overview of the facility is provided in the next 
section, followed by a description of and calculations for the insider theft scenarios for 
the various theft and detection timelines.  
4.1 FACILITY OVERVIEW  
The hypothetical nuclear manufacturing facility (NMF) recycles nuclear material 
from old dismantled systems into parts for new systems.  The dismantled parts are 
shipped to the NMF where they are broken into chips, recast for machining into new 
                                               
2  The facility description used here is adapted from one used in training exercises for the Advanced 
Vulnerability Assessment Overview and Insider Training Courses developed by Sandia National 
Laboratories [32]. 
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parts, then packaged and shipped out to be assembled into new systems.  Figure 19 
provides an overview of the NMF layout.  The NMF includes two MAAs, the main 
process facility (26) and storage bunker (20), within a PA inside a two-fence perimeter 
with lights and towers.  Two entrances allow vehicles into the PA, one (6) for non-
commercial vehicles (mostly the management’s personally owned vehicles) and the other 
(4) for shipments of materials, chemicals, and nuclear material.  The processing facility 
workers park in a lot (3) outside the PA fence and e ter on foot through the entry control 
point (ECP) building (5).  A rail entrance on the south of the facility allows for infrequent 
rail shipments.  Along with the process facility and storage bunker, six buildings are 
inside the PA perimeter, including a cafeteria (16), three support buildings that house  
 
 
Figure 19: Overview of Nuclear Manufacturing Facility ayout [32]. 
55 
offices and light laboratory facilities (17, 18, 19), a shipping and receiving facility (23), 
an X-ray facility (24),   The PA perimeter consists of two 2.5-m high chain-link fences 
installed five meters apart; the fences are under observation primarily by the guards in 
towers at each corner of the PA perimeter (7, 10, 12, 14).  Random patrols inside the PA 
perimeter are conducted by an officer on foot.  Theguards in the ECP also provide some 
observation of the PA perimeter within viewing distance of the ECP building.  
The outer perimeter of the site is enclosed by a single fence (1).   The north fence 
surrounding the external administrative campus (15)is a 2.5-m high with standard chain-
link fabric.  The site entrance gate on the north side of the site (2) is unlocked during 
normal working hours and is locked the rest of the time.  The area outside the perimeter 
has a 20-m cleared zone which is bounded by trees in several locations.  The terrain is 
relatively flat.  Random patrols are conducted around the site on a road around the 
outside of the perimeter.   
The process facility near the center of the PA is where the bulk of the processing 
work is performed.  The ECP building straddles the PA perimeter and houses some of the 
guard force.  The ECP into the PA (5) is the main entry point for pedestrian and vehicular 
traffic where checks are conducted on entry and egress.  The outer gate (6) and the ECP 
are unlocked and open during the normal five-day work h urs, which are 7 AM to 6 PM, 
but locked the rest of the time.  Upon entry into the ECP, personnel must show their 
badge, place their personal items on an X-ray machine belt, and walk through a metal 
detector.  Personnel exiting the processing area enter the ECP through the double doors 
and pass through a nuclear material monitoring portal.  Management and some visitors 
may enter in personal vehicles through the outer gate to park in the PA.  All vehicles 
entering the PA are subject to search upon entry and pass through a nuclear material 
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detector upon exit.  Commercial vehicles entering the ECP must present written 
authorization. 
Within the process facility, chipping, melting, casting, and machining operations 
are performed.  The process facility is the primary material area and includes vaults that 
contain in-process materials (chips, billets, and fi ished product).  The finished products 
normally weigh between 2 and 3 kg (depending on the particular product being 
manufactured).  In preparation for off-site shipment, products are packaged in shipping 
containers and moved to the bunker for storage pending shipment.   
The storage bunker is used for storage of nuclear material shipped in for recycling 
and for storage of finished products packed and reay to ship.  The material for recycling 
is received in approved shipping containers that weigh 100 kg.  The product containers 
weigh 50 or 100 kg (depending on the type).  The 100-kg product containers are 
essentially the same as the containers for received material.  The 50-kg containers are 
designed to fit inside a larger shipping overpack container and are not as robust as the 
100-kg container.  They are about one half as tall and the lids snap on with three quick 
release levers.  The same type of inner container is used for all items (there will be some 
variations in shape/size).   
The processing area has an extensive material measurement and control system in 
place, including procedures to receive material from off-site, to transfer material from the 
storage bunker to processing, to repackage and weigh material in-process, and to move 
product within the site for X-ray and storage.  All measurements and container 
identification are documented at each process step.  This information is sent to the 
MC&A recording area where it is examined, stored, and used to derive a weekly book 
inventory and material balance.  In addition, a physical inventory is conducted monthly.   
57 
The personnel at the NMF include managers, shift supervisors, operators, 
maintenance staff, technician, guards, and administrative support.  The Material Control 
Manager (MCM) is assigned responsibility for technial coordination of the overall 
MC&A program and has specific duties associated with receipt of recycling material onto 
the site, shipments of finished product off-site, and records for materials in the PA 
outside the processing facility (storage bunker, X-ray, and sampling).  The Material 
Custodian (MC) reports directly to the MCM and has re ponsibility for materials in the 
processing facility.  Both these positions have a high level of access to materials, 
equipment and tools in the PA; authority to request, document, and approve material 
transfers and measurement records; and knowledge about processing and material control 
operations.  
4.2 BASIC INSIDER THEFT SCENARIO  
The basic scenario used for the demonstration analyses involves theft of feed 
material or finished product from the storage bunker within the PA and removal through 
the personal vehicle entrance.  The MCM is the insider adversary and has authorized 
access through the outer gate to park in the PA and to enter to all buildings and areas 
within the PA.  Inventory in the bunker is conducted on a monthly basis, and transfers 
from the bunker to the processing building occur on a regular basis.  In addition, the 
nuclear material detector on the outer gate into the PA has maintenance scheduled on a 
monthly basis.  While maintenance occurs, use of the nuclear material detector is 
replaced by a general random vehicle search.  The plan is to acquire target material 
during authorized access at the bunker, conceal it on his person, move it to an office in 
the laboratory/office building nearest the PA parking area, and then move it to his vehicle 
to exit the PA when maintenance is occurring on the nuclear material detector on the 
outer gate.  
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4.3 SCENARIOS FOR ONE DAILY MC&A  DETECTION ACTIVITY AND VARYING 
TIMELINES  
This set of scenarios will consider varying timelins for the MAA and PA 
physical protection layers and one daily MC&A detection activity.  The MCM has daily 
access to the storage bunker.  In these scenarios, the MCM’s opportunity to remove target 
material occurs once every day, and this insider will make a decision during a given 
timeline as to which day will be most advantageous to remove the material from each 
physical protection layer.  His decision to take action is based on his knowledge of when 
certain operational conditions (material transfers o  detector maintenance) might occur 
and to what extent he can exploit these.  Each protecti n layer considers both PPS and 
MC&A detection elements.  
4.3.1 30-Day Timeline for the MAA and for the PA 
This scenario involves a 30-day theft timeline in both the MAA and PA, for a 
total scenario timeline of 60 days.  Inventory is performed once a month in the storage 
bunker, and because of his access and authority, the MCM knows he has an opportunity 
to use deceit to hide any inventory discrepancies in the MAA.  Material transfers between 
the bunker and the process building MAA occur on a regular basis, although the MCM 
may not know specifically when a transfer may occur.  This timeline also considers the 
30-day window between maintenance of the nuclear material detector at the outer gate.  
Because the opportunity to remove target material may occur on any given day in both 
the MAA and PA, for this example the insider theft timelines are defined as uniform 
discrete distributions for each of these theft stages. 
This example tracks the theft and detection for this scenario through an ESD (see 
Figure 20).  The scenario begins with detection of the t by the PPS protection elements in 
the MAA, Event 1 in the ESD.  Because the adversary is an insider with authorized 
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access and operational knowledge, it is assumed that he will be able to circumvent the 
PPS protection elements.  The only PPS protection element that may provide detection in 
this situation is general observation of suspicious r unauthorized activity by guards or 
other personnel in the area.  Garcia [17] discusses how general observation has a very 
low probability of detection activity, so the probability of detection for this event is 






























































Figure 20. ESD for tracking theft and detection. 
Figure 21 illustrates Event 1 in the ESD.  If detection occurs and material is recovered, 
the end state for this event sequence is “Material Recovered,” and the overall sequence 













Figure 21: Event 1 of the ESD – Detection of the insider taking the material by the PPS 
in the MAA 
Event 2 is an MC&A detection that occurs while the stolen material is still in the 
MAA.  This scenario begins with the 30-day scenario calculations described in Section 
3.6 for removal of material from the MAA.  From the calculations in Section 3.6 for an 
MC&A activity with a low initial probability of detection of 0.02 and a moderate level of 
dependence, the probability of timely MC&A detection is 0.106, and the probability of 
non-detection is 0.894.  If timely MC&A detection occurs, then the facility moves to an 
alert state in which it is known that material is not where it should be.  Also, in this case, 
the insider adversary has not been able to remove the material from the MAA into the 
PA.  Figure 22 illustrates the ESD through Event 2 with the possible paths to an alert 




















Figure 22: The ESD through Event 2 – Timely MC&A detection in the MAA 
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Events 3 and 4 will be for detection in the PA.  Event 3 is for detection by PPS 
protection elements of material moving into the PA.  Two conditions and paths through 
the ESD are possible here depending on whether the facility is in the alert state or 
continued normal operations.  If no alert occurs, then detection of unauthorized activity 
again is provided only by general observation and the probability of detection is 0.02.  
Once the MCM has taken the target material out of the bunker, he will have to move it 
across the PA into the laboratory/office building nearest the PA parking lot.  If detection 
occurs, the end state for this event sequence is “Material Recovered,” and the overall 
sequence probability is 0.018 (0.98 x 0.894 x 0.02).  With no detection for this event, the 
sequence continues onto Event 4.   
For the second condition for Event 3, when the facility is in an alert state and it is 
known that material is not where it should be, it is expected that additional efforts will be 
made throughout the facility to locate the missing material.  The probability for detection 
then can be increased because of these additional efforts.  If detection does not occur, the 
MCM is able to successfully move the material out of the PA, but the facility remains in 
the alert state.  The probability of detection during an alert state is set at 0.50 to reflect 
increased efforts (significantly greater than relying on general observation) to locate the 
missing material.  If detection occurs, the end state for this event sequence is “Material 
Recovered,” and the overall sequence probability is 0.052 (0.98 x 0.106 x 0.50); 
otherwise the event sequence skips Event 4 (because MC&A detection has already 
occurred) and continues on to Event 5 with the facility in the alert state.  Figure 23 





































Figure 23: The ESD through Event 3 – Detection of the insider moving the material by 
the PPS in the PA 
Event 4 is MC&A detection that occurs while material is in the PA.  To calculate 
the probability of timely MC&A detection in the PA, first the probability of timely 
MC&A detection any time before the material leaves the PA during the composite 
timeline is calculated, PD,Comp.  This value then is used with the probability of timely 
MC&A detection in the MAA (PD2) to infer the probability of timely MC&A detection i  
the PA (PD4).  The calculation method for probabilistic inferenc  is described later in this 
section after a discussion of the composite theft timeline during which the MCM can 
move material from the MAA and then the PA.   Once th  theft has progressed into the 
PA, the scenario timeline is the sum of the individual timelines in the MAA and the PA, 
in this case up to 30 days each for a total scenario timeline of up to 60 days.  The theft 
timeline includes every possible composite timeline ov r the 60-day duration.  For this 
scenario, the timeline for each physical protection layer ranges from 1 to 30 days, and so 
30 x 30 = 900 composite timelines are possible.  To determine the probability distribution 
for theft over the complete 60-day scenario, the two individual uniform distributions have 
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to be summed to determine the probability of theft for the possible composite timelines 
for each day.  The individual timelines are independent discrete random variables, T1 and 
T2, with uniform distribution functions, and T3 is their sum.  The distribution function for 
the composite timeline is determined by convolution of the distribution functions for T1 
and T2, as follows: 











t2 = t3 - t1 for T3 = T1 + T2.   
To calculate timely MC&A detection with Equation 16, PNTn, the probability that 
the material has not been removed from the facility before day n is calculated as the 
complementary cumulative probability distribution of the composite theft timeline.  The 
MC&A detection timeline is also determined for the 60-day duration of the theft timeline.  
The calculation of timely MC&A detection then follows the same steps outlined for the 
30-day scenario in Section 3.6.  For an MC&A activity with an initial probability of 
detection of 0.20 and a moderate level of dependence, the probability of timely MC&A 
detection for the composite timeline is 0.126.  This calculation of timely MC&A 
detection considers the total 60-day timeline and is a composite of timely MC&A 
detection for both the MAA and the PA.  The portion that applies to timely detection in 
the PA must be inferred from the composite detection and timely detection in the MAA.  
The method for this probabilistic inference is described as follows.  Figure 24 shows a 
condensed event tree with the two MC&A detection events, one in the MAA and one in 
the PA, along with the sequence probabilities for each of the three possible end states, as 
follows:   
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Figure 24: Event tree for MC&A events in the composite timeline. 
The sum of the probabilities for the three end state  must equal one.  The required value 
























=  (28) 
The value for (X + Y) is 0.126 and was calculated above as the probability of timely 
MC&A detection for the composite 60-day timeline; the value of PD2 was calculated for 
Event 2.  The value  













P  (29) 
is the value for the probability of timely MC&A detection for Event 4; the probability of 
non-detection is 0.978.  If timely MC&A detection occurs here, then the facility has 
another opportunity to move to an alert state in which it is known that material is not 
where it should be.  Again, in this case, the insider adversary has not been able to remove 
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the material out of the PA.  Figure 25 illustrates he ESD through Event 4 with the 












































Figure 25: The ESD through Event 4 – Timely MC&A detection in the PA 
Event 5 is for detection by PPS protection elements of material moving out of the 
PA through the outer gate, which the MCM will plan to do when the nuclear material 
detector is in maintenance so his vehicle is subject only to a random vehicle search.  
Similarly to the case for Event 3, two conditions and paths through the ESD are possible 
here depending on whether the facility is in the alert state or continued normal operations.  
If no alert occurs, then detection of unauthorized activity again is provided only by 
detection of the material during a random vehicle search.  Once the MCM has moved the 
target material across the PA into the laboratory/office building nearest the PA parking 
lot, he will look for an opportunity to take it to his vehicle when the detector at the gate is 
undergoing maintenance.  Again, detection relies on general observation of suspicious or 
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unauthorized activity, and the probability of detection is set to 0.02.  The final end states 
for the two sequences from this event are “Material Recovered,” with an overall sequence 
probability of 0.017 (0.98 x 0.894 x 0.98 x 0.978 x 0.02), and “Material Lost” with a 
sequence probability of 0.823 (0.98 x 0.894 x 0.98 x 0.978 x 0.98).   
For the second condition for Event 5, when the facility is in an alert state and it is 
known that material is not where it should be, it is expected that additional efforts will be 
made throughout the facility to locate the missing material.  This is another opportunity 
to increase the probability for detection because of these additional efforts.  The 
probability of detection during alert is set at 0.50, again to reflect increased efforts to 
locate missing material.  If detection occurs, the end state for this event sequence is 
“Material Recovered,” and the overall sequence probability is 0.009 (0.98 x 0.894 x 0.98 
x 0.022 x 0.50).  Otherwise two event sequences end in an “Alert” state:  the sequence 
that continues from Event 3 with a sequence probability of 0.026 (0.98 x 0.106 x 0.50 x  
0.50) and the sequence from Event 4 with a sequence probability of 0.009 (0.98 x 0.894 x 
0.98 x 0.022 x 0.50).  Figure 26 illustrates the ESD through Event 5.  
If detection does not occur and the MCM is able to successfully move the material 
out of the PA, the facility remains in the alert state.  This is an important distinction in 
terms of information a site has about the status of critical items.  The “Material 
Recovered” end state indicates that the theft was detected or an MC&A activity alerted 
the facility that material was not where it should be and that subsequent actions recovered 
the material before it could be taken out of the facility.  The “Material Lost” end state 
indicates that no MC&A alert occurred and the facility has no information at the end of 
the scenario timeline that material is missing – the case of where you do not know what 
you do not know.  An end state of “Alert” indicates that although material may have been 
successfully removed from the site, the facility knows that material is missing and can 
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continue efforts to recover the material, pursue those responsible for the theft and address 
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Figure 26: The ESD through Event 5 – Detection by the PPS of the insider moving the 
material out of the PA 
This set of calculations for the 30-day MAA/30-day PA timeline scenario was 
performed for each level of dependence and the low, middle, and high initial probability 
of MC&A detection.  Figure 27 shows the event sequence calculations in which Events 2 
and 4 represent the timely MC&A detection probabilities for each of the five dependence 
levels for low probabilities of detection for the init al theft action, MC&A observations, 
and the detection of moving materials.  Some of these probabilities should be considered  
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Figure 27:  Event sequence calculations for the 30-day MAA/30-day PA timeline 















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































artificially low because no real facility would be p rmitted to operate with such poor PPS 
and MC&A performance.  In this figure, the events shaded in blue are for detection and 
result in an end state of “Material Recovered,” those in purple are for MC&A “Alert” 
states, and those in pink are for “Material Lost.”  As expected from the dependence 
relationships, except for the first end state, the values for the individual sequence end 
states increase as dependence among MC&A observations decreases from complete to 
zero dependence.  This decrease factor varies from about 9 to about 12.   
The end state summary results are also provided for this scenario in Figure 27.  
The total probability for the “Material Recovered” end states increases from 0.073 to 
0.321 (over 3 and a half times) as dependence among MC&A observations moves from 
complete to zero dependence.  The total probability for the “Alert” end states increases 
from 0.005 to 0.150 (almost 30 times).  The probability that the facility knows the 
material is missing before it is taken offsite, which combines the “Material Recovered” 
and the “Alert” end states, increases from 0.078 to 0.471 (over 5 times) as independence 
among MC&A observations is achieved.   
It is also important to note how the consideration of MC&A observations affects 
the analyst’s perception of the likelihood of adversary success for an insider theft 
scenario.  For this scenario, with no MC&A detection, the total sequence probabilities for 
the “Material Recovered” and “Material Lost” would be 0.059 and 0.941, respectively.  
Including in each physical protection layer one daily MC&A activity with a low initial 
probability of detection improves the probability of recovering the material from over 
20% for complete dependence to more than four times for zero dependence for MC&A 
observations.  Including MC&A detection improves the probability that the facility 
knows material is missing before it is taken offsite from over 30% to almost seven times 
as dependence among MC&A observations decreases from complete to zero dependence.    
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Figures 28 and 29 show similar event sequence calculations for the medium 
(0.50) and high (0.99) initial probabilities of MC&A detection, respectively.  In each 
case, the same type of increases with decreasing depen nce among MC&A observations 
are evident for the individual event sequences as well as for the “Material Recovered” 
and “Alert” end state summaries.  For the 0.50 initial MC&A detection probability, the 
“Material Recovered,” and “Alert” end states almost double (increase from 0.529 to 
0.998).  Including in each physical protection one daily MC&A activity with a medium 
initial probability of detection improves the probability of recovering the material from 
about 8 times to about 16 times with decreasing dependence among MC&A observations.  
For the 0.99 initial MC&A detection probability, the total probability for the “Material 
Recovered” and “Alert” end states increases about 16 times over not including MC&A 
detection. 
4.3.2 Variations of Timelines in the MAA and PA 
The previous section described the analysis of an adversary timeline in which the 
time delay between each of the discontinuous events wa  defined as a uniform 
distribution over 30 days.  This section and the next two explore how the characteristics 
of the adversary timeline and the MC&A detection timeline affect the security system 
effectiveness computed by this method. 
The characteristics of the adversary timeline are aff cted by the scheduling of 
events that the adversary chooses to use or vulnerabilities he chooses to exploit in an 
attack scenario, as well as the adversary’s knowledge of when the events occur.  Both of 
these effects are captured in the probability distribu ions used to represent the adversary 




Figure 28: Event sequence calculations for the 30-day MAA/30-day PA timeline 



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 29: Event sequence calculations for the 30-day MAA/30-day PA timeline 




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































• Uniform timeline – timeline for a condition that occurs at regular intervals; the 
interval is known to the insider, but the specific s hedule is not; timeline is 
represented by a uniform probability distribution.   
• Fixed timeline – timeline for a condition that occurs a fixed duration after a 
previous enabling condition; the enabling condition and fixed duration are known 
to the insider; the timeline is represented by a fixed delay time.   
• Uncertain timeline – timeline for a condition that occurs randomly with a specific 
(estimated) likelihood each day; the timeline is represented by a geometric 
probability distribution. 
The duration of the delay between discontinuous tasks is captured in the parameters of 
the distribution.  Convolution must be used to calcul te the values used in the model from 
the distributions.  This section examines four additional adversary theft timelines that 
make use of different delays that are modeled as fixed durations and uniform durations in 
order to demonstrate how the MC&A detection probabilities and overall event sequence 
probabilities vary for changes in the delays the adversary will encounter between 
discontinuous scenario events.  The next two sections examines a more realistic facility 
analysis by using a set of activities to determine the MC&A detection probabilities, first 
with a uniform adversary theft timeline (Section 4.3.3) and then with a geometric 
distribution for the adversary theft timeline (Section 4.3.4).  Table 5 presents the four 
adversary timelines evaluated in this section.  Theexample from Section 4.3.1 (Timeline 
2) is included as a point of comparison.  
Timely MC&A detection for Event 2 is determined as described in Section 3.6.2.  
Table 6 presents the MC&A detection probabilities for Event 2 for each of the five 
different timeline scenarios.  Comparing the three timeline durations within a single 
dependence level, with the exception of complete dependence, the longer the timeline for 
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Table 5: Five adversary timelines  
Timeline Event 2 Delay 2 Event 4  Delay 2 
1 
MC&A in MAA  
5 days – uniform 
distribution 
MC&A in PA  
30 days – uniform 
distribution 
2 
30 days – uniform 
distribution 
30 days – uniform 
distribution 
3 
90 days – uniform 
distribution 
30 days – uniform 
distribution 
4 
5 days – uniform 
distribution 5 days – fixed delay 
5 
5 days – uniform 
distribution 
30 days – fixed 
delay 
 
Table 6: Event 2 probability of timely MC&A detection for the five scenario 
timelines for five dependence levels and low (0.02), medium (0.50), and 






Complete High Moderate Low Zero 
1. 5-day Uniform/  
 30-day Uniform 
0.02 0.020 0.032 0.049 0.055 0.058 
0.50 0.500 0.638 0.764 0.792 0.806 
0.99 0.990 0.995 0.998 0.998 0.998 
2. 30-day Uniform/  
 30-day Uniform 
 
0.02 0.020 0.038 0.106 0.180 0.258 
0.50 0.500 0.699 0.939 0.962 0.967 
0.99 0.990 0.997 1.000 1.000 1.000 
3. 90-day Uniform/ 
 30-day Uniform 
0.02 0.020 0.039 0.123 0.269 0.544 
0.50 0.500 0.707 0.969 0.987 0.989 
0.99 0.990 0.997 0.999 0.999 0.999 
4. 5-day Uniform/ 
 5-day Fixed 
0.02 0.020 0.032 0.049 0.055 0.058 
0.50 0.500 0.638 0.764 0.792 0.806 
0.99 0.990 0.995 0.998 0.998 0.998 
5. 5-day Uniform/  
 30-day Fixed 
0.02 0.020 0.032 0.049 0.055 0.058 
0.50 0.500 0.638 0.764 0.792 0.806 
0.99 0.990 0.995 0.998 0.998 0.998 
 
MC&A detection in the MAA, the higher the probability of timely MC&A detection.  
Similarly, across dependence levels, the probability of detection increases more with 
decreasing dependence between MC&A observations for a l nger timeline in the MAA.  
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These results again emphasize the importance of extending an insider’s theft timeline to 
increase the facility’s probability of detecting suspicious or unauthorized actions. 
The other significant difference among the timeline sc narios is the one-time theft 
opportunity in the PA for the last two timeline scenarios listed above.  Having only one 
opportunity to move the material in the PA reduces significantly the calculations for the 
number of possible composite timelines, each of which has a higher individual 
probability (1/5 for the 5-day uniform/30-fixed timeline compared to 1/150 for the 5-day 
uniform/30-day uniform timeline).  With a fixed timeline in the PA, the total duration of 
the composite timelines will vary from six to ten days for the 5-day uniform/5-day fixed 
timeline and from 31 to 35 days for the 5-day uniform/30-day fixed timeline.  For MC&A 
detection in the PA, Table 7 presents the MC&A detection probabilities for Event 4 in the 
ESD.  Reducing the opportunity for moving material in the PA essentially removes theft 
scenarios of two to five days for the 5-day uniform/5-day fixed timeline and two to 30 
days for the 5-day uniform/30-day fixed timeline.  Thus, the shortest adversary scenarios 
timelines are prevented, so there is greater opportunity for MC&A observations to detect 
the material as missing before it is removed from the facility.  The resulting MC&A 
detection probabilities in the PA generally increase compared to a uniform timeline in the 
PA – for example 0.086, 0.931, and 0.999 for the low, moderate and high initial 
probability of detection, for moderate dependence between MC&A observations for the 
5-day uniform/30-day fixed composite timeline compared to 0.067, 0.831, and 0.956, 
respectively, for the 5-day uniform/30-day uniform composite timeline. 
Another point to note for the Event 4 MC&A detection probabilities is the very 
low values for complete and high dependence.  The low values are independent of 
distribution type and somewhat independent of duration and initial probability of MC&A 
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Table 7: Event 4 probability of timely MC&A detection for the five scenario 
timelines for five dependence levels and low (0.02), medium (0.50), and 





Dependence of MC&A Detection Activities 
Complete High Moderate Low Zero 
1. 5-day Uniform/  
 30-day Uniform 
0.02 0.000 0.007 0.067 0.149 0.242 
0.50 0.000 0.189 0.831 0.920 0.933 
0.99 0.000 0.397 0.956 0.964 0.966 
2. 30-day Uniform/  
 30-day Uniform 
 
0.02 0.000 0.001 0.022 0.092 0.242 
0.50 0.000 0.039 0.648 0.917 0.933 
0.99 0.000 0.103 0.952 0.964 0.966 
3. 90-day Uniform/ 
 30-day Uniform 
0.02 0.000 4E-04 0.007 0.042 0.242 
0.50 0.000 0.013 0.426 0.916 0.933 
0.99 0.000 0.037 0.944 0.964 0.966 
4. 5-day Uniform/ 
 5-day Fixed 
0.02 0.000 0.007 0.041 0.062 0.078 
0.50 0.000 0.192 0.745 0.886 0.938 
0.99 0.000 0.406 0.987 1.000 1.000 
5. 5-day Uniform/  
 30-day Fixed 
0.02 0.000 0.008 0.086 0.235 0.443 
0.50 0.000 0.202 0.931 1.000 1.000 
0.99 0.000 0.420 0.999 1.000 1.000 
detection.  These higher levels of dependence make l ter MC&A observations less 
effective (in fact, MC&A detection probability in the PA is 0 for complete dependence).  
If material has not been detected missing by the tim  it is moved out of the MAA, it is 
unlikely that it will be detected as missing while it is still in the PA. 
Tables 8 through 12 present the end state summaries for the five different 
timelines.  It is evident from these results that MC&A detection as an alert provides an 
additional significant contribution to overall detec ion of an insider theft.  Figure 30 is a 
plot of the results for the three uniform composite timelines that shows the general trends 
of increasing probability for the alert and material ecovered end states with decreasing 
dependence between MC&A observations and increasing timelines for the PA.  Figure 31 
is a plot of the results for the three 5-day MAA timelines with the respective uniform or 
fixed PA timelines. 
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Dependence of MC&A Detection Activities 
Complete High Moderate Low Zero 
0.02 
Material Recovered 0.073 0.084 0.122 0.162 0.205 
Alert 0.005 0.011 0.043 0.081 0.124 
Material Recovered 
 + Alert 
0.078 0.096 0.165 0.243 0.329 
Material Lost 0.922 0.904 0.835 0.757 0.671 
0.50 
Material Recovered 0.407 0.535 0.681 0.699 0.703 
Alert 0.123 0.189 0.281 0.286 0.284 
Material Recovered 
 + Alert 
0.529 0.724 0.963 0.984 0.988 
Material Lost 0.471 0.276 0.037 0.016 0.012 
0.99 
Material Recovered 0.748 0.752 0.754 0.754 0.754 
Alert 0.243 0.245 0.246 0.246 0.246 
Material Recovered 
 + Alert 
0.991 0.997 ~0.999 ~1.000 ~1.000 
Material Lost 0.009 0.003 1E-04 7E-05 6E-05 
These results further reinforce the insights from the analysis in the previous 
section, namely: 
• Decreasing dependence among MC&A observations increase the sequence 
probabilities for the Material Recovered and Alert nd states.  MC&A activities 
with at most a moderate level of dependence between observations can provide 
significant improvement in overall effectiveness. 
• Longer timelines improve detection effectiveness.  Forcing the adversary to keep 
material in a physical protection layer longer provides more opportunity for 
detection so that even low initial probabilities of MC&A detection can result in a 
significantly higher cumulative probability of detec ion. 
• Higher initial probabilities of MC&A detection for an activity can accommodate a 
higher level of dependence between MC&A observations, although less 
opportunity is available to improve overall cumulative probability of detection. 
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End State Dependence of MC&A Detection Activities  
Complete High Moderate Low Zero 
0.02 
Material Recovered 0.073 0.086 0.142 0.219 0.321 
Alert 0.005 0.010 0.035 0.080 0.150 
Material Recovered 
 + Alert 0.078 0.096 0.177 0.300 0.471 
Material Lost 0.922 0.904 0.823 0.700 0.529 
0.50 
Material Recovered 0.407 0.551 0.731 0.745 0.746 
Alert 0.123 0.177 0.249 0.252 0.252 
Material Recovered 
 + Alert 0.529 0.727 0.980 0.997 0.998 
Material Lost 0.471 0.273 0.020 0.003 0.002 
0.99 
Material Recovered 0.748 0.753 0.755 0.755 0.755 
Alert 0.243 0.244 0.245 0.245 0.245 
Material Recovered 
 + Alert 0.991 0.997 ~1.000 ~1.000 ~1.000 
Material Lost 0.009 0.003 2E-05 1E-05 1E-05 
 




End State Dependence of MC&A Detection Activities  
Complete High Moderate Low Zero 
0.02 
Material Recovered 0.073 0.086 0.147 0.260 0.488 
Alert 0.005 0.010 0.033 0.081 0.186 
Material Recovered 
 + Alert 0.078 0.096 0.180 0.341 0.674 
Material Lost 0.922 0.904 0.820 0.659 0.326 
0.50 
Material Recovered 0.407 0.553 0.739 0.752 0.752 
Alert 0.123 0.175 0.244 0.247 0.247 
Material Recovered 
 + Alert 0.530 0.728 0.983 0.999 0.999 
Material Lost 0.470 0.272 0.017 0.001 0.001 
0.99 
Material Recovered 0.748 0.753 0.755 0.755 0.755 
Alert 0.243 0.244 0.245 0.245 0.245 
Material Recovered 
 + Alert 0.991 0.997 ~1.000 ~1.000 ~1.000 
Material Lost 0.009 0.003 7E-06 4E-06 4E-06 
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End State Dependence of MC&A Detection Activities  
Complete High Moderate Low Zero 
0.02 
Material Recovered 0.073 0.084 0.111 0.124 0.133 
Alert 0.005 0.011 0.031 0.042 0.049 
Material Recovered 
 + Alert 0.078 0.096 0.142 0.166 0.182 
Material Lost 0.922 0.904 0.858 0.834 0.818 
0.50 
Material Recovered 0.407 0.535 0.672 0.695 0.704 
Alert 0.123 0.190 0.272 0.282 0.285 
Material Recovered 
 + Alert 0.530 0.725 0.944 0.977 0.989 
Material Lost 0.470 0.275 0.056 0.023 0.011 
0.99 
Material Recovered 0.748 0.752 0.754 0.754 0.755 
Alert 0.243 0.245 0.246 0.246 0.245 
Material Recovered 
 + Alert 0.991 0.997 ~1.000 ~1.000 ~1.000 
Material Lost 0.009 0.003 3E-05 5E-07 2E-11 
 




End State Dependence of MC&A Detection Activities  
Complete High Moderate Low Zero 
0.02 
Material Recovered 0.073 0.085 0.130 0.199 0.292 
Alert 0.005 0.011 0.051 0.120 0.215 
Material Recovered 
 + Alert 0.078 0.096 0.181 0.319 0.507 
Material Lost 0.922 0.904 0.819 0.681 0.493 
0.50 
Material Recovered 0.407 0.537 0.692 0.706 0.709 
Alert 0.123 0.191 0.293 0.294 0.291 
Material Recovered 
 + Alert 0.530 0.728 0.985 ~1.000 ~1.000 
Material Lost 0.471 0.272 0.015 6E-05 3E-10 
0.99 
Material Recovered 0.757 0.755 0.754 0.754 0.755 
Alert 0.243 0.245 0.246 0.246 0.245 
Material Recovered 
 + Alert 0.990 ~1.000 ~1.000 ~1.000 1.000 
Material Lost 0.009 0.003 2E-06 1E-13 0.000 
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Figure 30: Plot of material recovered + alert end state summary results for the three 
uniform composite timelines 
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Figure 31: Plot of material recovered + alert end state summary results for the three 
5-day MAA timelines and respective uniform and fixed PA timelines 
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4.3.3 Analysis for Facility-level MC&A Operations 
To explore the proposed methods, the previous analyses demonstrate the extended 
path analysis methodology for the following limited conditions: 
• One daily MC&A activity 
• Low, medium and high initial probabilities of MC&A detection (complements of 
BHEPs associated with certain types of NPP operations) 
• Detection timelines based on the dependency relationsh ps between MC&A 
observations  
• Uniform and fixed timelines of varying durations and 
• Multiple physical protection layers. 
Actual facility-level MC&A operations are much more complex and involve many 
MC&A activities that are performed at various intervals.  To demonstrate the extended 
path analysis methodology for scenarios that are more representative of the complexity of 
actual facility MC&A operations, additional analyses were done for a 5-day MAA/30-day 
PA scenario timeline for a set of MC&A activities tha  occur at different intervals.   
Table 13 presents a detection opportunity timeline for a notional set of six MC&A 
activities at a facility.  Each of the six activities occurs at a different interval and has been 
assigned a BHEP as determined in Table 1.  Also, each activity has been assigned a given 
level of dependence, and the day-to-day calculations of the BHEP reflect this dependence 
relationship.  For example, the Forms Reconciliation activity, which occurs every three 
days, has a high level of dependence between each performance of this activity.  The 





each performance of this activity.  In this example, the Plan of the Day and Daily 
Administrative Check are performed once a day by the same person, so these activities 
are assigned a high level of dependence between the performance of each of these 
activities. 
The daily probability of detection can be determined by combining the BHEPs as 








1   (30) 
For example, on Day 3, the set of MC&A activities includes: 
• 1 – Plan of the Day, 
• 3 – Forms Reconciliation, and 
• 4 – Daily Administrative Check. 
and the daily probability of detection, PMC&A,3, is calculated as: 
( )( )( )[ ]
































The probability of MC&A detection on day three is hig er than that for the previous two 
days because additional MC&A activities have occurred on this day to contribute to a 
higher level of detection for the set of MC&A activities.  The MC&A detection timeline 
for the scenario is determined from the daily probabilities of MC&A detection. This 
detection timeline for 35 days is illustrated in Figure 32.  Over the course of the 35-day 
timeline, the daily probability of MC&A detection icreases as additional activities occur 
to contribute to detection, or decreases as the depndence relationships reduce detection 
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between observations.  The underlying effect of the dependency relationships is also 
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Figure 32: Daily probability of detection over a 35-day period for a set of MC&A 
activities 
The detection timeline for the set of MC&A activities was evaluated against an 
adversary timeline in which Delay 1 for MC&A in the MAA was represented as a 5-day 
uniform distribution and Delay 2 for MC&A in the PA was represented as a 30-day 
uniform distribution.  For the 5-day MAA timeline, the daily values of MC&A detection 
for the first five days (Table 14) are used in the convolution calculation.  For this case, 
timely MC&A detection for Event 2 in the ESD is calu ated to be 0.98.  For the 
composite MAA/PA timelines, the daily values of MC&A detection for the 35-day 
composite timeline are used in the convolution calcul tion, and timely MC&A detection 
for Event 4 in the ESD is calculated to be 0.938.  The sequence probabilities for the 
Material Recovered and Alert end states are 0.750 and 0.249, respectively.  Thus, the set 
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of MC&A activities result in a level of MC&A detection similar to that for a single 
MC&A activity with a high initial probability of detection, even though some of the 
MC&A activities in the set have high and moderate leve s of dependence between 
observations and across activities. 
This analysis demonstrates the applicability of the extended path analysis methods 
for more realistic facility conditions.  The daily probability of detection in Figure 32 
provides insights for evaluating the protection leve  provided by MC&A activities over 
time and identifying gaps in that protection level.  For example, daily probability of 
detection from days 15 through 27 indicate that additional protection is needed and action 
should be taken to reduce dependency in the performance of MC&A activities, or to add 
other activities that would increase the protection level during that time period.  The 
importance of MC&A activities is also evident – while a single MC&A activity has the 
potential to contribute significantly to cumulative d tection, a set of activities has the 
potential to maintain cumulative detection over time.   
4.3.4 Addressing Uncertainty in Insider Theft Timelines 
To further address the complexity of actual insider theft scenarios, the detection 
timeline for the set of MC&A activities described in Section 4.3.3 was used with an 
insider theft timeline composed of geometric distribut ons.  The convolution of these 
distributions was computed using LHS sampling.  This approach to determine an insider 
theft timeline reflects the uncertainty in an insider’s theft timeline as well as an analyst’s 
lack of knowledge about possible insider theft timel nes.   
In LHS, the convolution for the composite MAA/PA timeline was determined by 
sampling 2000 observations for two each of the distributions (MAATHEFT and 
PATHEFT) for a geometric distribution with three different values for probability of 
failure.  The geometric distribution was selected because it represents the number of 
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successful trials that might be observed before a failure occurs.  For insider theft, the 
probability of failure is the probability that the facility will be in a vulnerable state that 
the malicious insider will find favorable enough to attempt to move material to the next 
physical protection layer.  Figure 33 is a plot of each of the three geometric distributions 
over their first 30 days.  In each composite theft timeline, the distributions for the MAA 
and PA theft timelines are the same.  Thus the three composite timelines considered in 
this analysis are each composed of two identical, but uncorrelated geometric distributions 
















Figure 33: Geometric distributions for theft timeline generated from LHS. 
To perform the calculations for timely MC&A detection in the MAA, each 
geometric distribution was used in the calculations as described in Section 3.6.2.  The 
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calculations for timely detection in the PA require convolution of the distributions for the 
MAA theft timeline and the PA theft timeline, which was done as follows.  LHS was 
used to draw 2000 observations for each distribution, and the values for each distribution 
were summed on an observation-by-observation basis to obtain observations for the total 
duration of the theft timeline.  The probability ofeach unique theft timeline value was 
determined through a frequency analysis of the resulting observation set.  The resulting 
set of probabilities was used to represent the theft timeline in the calculation of timely 
MC&A detection in the PA with an MC&A detection timeline for a set of MC&A 
activities as describe in Section 4.3.3.  Table 14 provides the values for timely MC&A 
detection in the MAA and PA.  Table 15 provides the end state summary results from the 
ESD calculations for the three geometric timeline sc narios. 
Table 14: Timely MC&A detection in the MAA (Event 2) and the PA (Event 4) for a 
set of MC&A activities and geometric distributions for theft timeline  
Composite MAA/PA Timeline 
 
Timely MC&A Detection  
MAA – Event 2 PA – Event 4 
Geometric Distribution 1 
P=0.20 
0.629 0.702 
Geometric Distribution 2 
P=0.50 0.241 0.328 
Geometric Distribution 3 
P=0.80 
0.038 0.064 
4.3.5 Mitigating Potential Malicious Insider Activity 
The application of HRA methods has provided a probabilistic basis for 
incorporating MC&A activities in an extended path analysis methodology.  One purpose 
for analyzing a PPS is to identify vulnerabilities or gain insights on the possible impacts 
of additional protection elements.  The final applicat on of HRA methods for 
characterizing MC&A activities was an exercise to demonstrate how these methods 
might be used to explore strategies for mitigating malicious insider activity.  This 
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Table 15: Comparison of end state summary results for 5-day MAA/30-day PA 
timeline and geometric distributions for theft timelin  for a set of MC&A 
activities 
Composite MAA/PA Timeline Initial PD,MC&A 
End State Sequence Probability 
Geometric Distribution 1 
P=0.20 (mean time before material is 
removed – 4 days) 
0.945 
Material Recovered 0.617 
Alert 0.279 
Material Recovered 
 + Alert 0.996 
Material Lost 0.004 
Geometric Distribution 2 
P=0.50 (mean time before material is 
removed – 1 day) 
0.945 
Material Recovered 0.341 
Alert 0.179 
Material Recovered 
 + Alert 0.520 
Material Lost 0.480 
Geometric Distribution 3 
P=0.80 (mean time before material is 
removed – < 1 day) 
0.945 
Material Recovered 0.114 
Alert 0.039 
Material Recovered 
 + Alert 0.153 
Material Lost 0.847 
5-day Uniform/30-day Uniform 0.945 
Material Recovered 0.750 
Alert 0.249 
Material Recovered 
 + Alert 
0.999 
Material Lost 0.001 
analysis used the 5-day MAA/5-day PA scenario timeline with uniform distributions for 
the theft timelines and the detection timeline develop d for a set of MC&A activities.  
This scenario timeline has a two-day to ten-day possible duration and 25 possible 
composite timelines.  Three cases for the MC&A detection timeline were addressed:  one 
for the baseline set of combined MC&A activities described in Table 13; a second 
assuming a malicious insider performs activities 1 and 4, which have a high level of 
dependence; and a third assuming the dependency relationship is removed for activity 4.  
The baseline case assumes that the insider has acces to the material, but is not in a 
position of performing MC&A tasks. 
For the first ten-day composite timeline, the detection timeline used the daily 
MC&A detection probabilities for the first ten days from the baseline set of combined 
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MC&A activities (Table 13).  In this baseline set of activities, it was assumed that 
activities 1 and 4 are performed by the same person on a daily basis, and therefore they 
are assigned a high level of dependence between recurren es of these activities.  The next 
variation for this timeline assumes that the person who performs activities 1 and 4 is a 
malicious insider who is seeking to steal material.  Consequently, the BHEP for these 
activities is set to 1 and the probability of detection is 0 because the thief is concealing 
the activities by misstating the results of the MC&A tasks.  In the third variation, the 
facility does not know about any malicious insider activity, but an operational change is 
made to remove the dependency relationship among these activities – instead of one 
person performing both activities, two people perform these activities.  The person who 
performs activity 1 is still assumed to be the malicious insider, and activity 4 is assumed 
to have the high level of dependence, the same as for the baseline set of activities because 
a single person (but not the malicious insider) always performs these tasks.   
Tables 16 and 17 provide the detection timelines for the variations with the 
malicious insider and the insider mitigation, respectiv ly.  Figure 34 is a plot of these 
detection timelines.  The original BHEPs for activities 1 and 4 provided in Table 13 for 
the set of MC&A activities no longer apply.  For the case of the malicious insider, these 
values in Table 16 are set to 1.0, as the insider who performs both these activities is 
trying to conceal malicious activity.  The probability of detection for these individual 
activities is zero.  Because activities 1 and 4 are the only ones performed on days 1 and 2, 
the daily probability of MC&A detection is also zero.  Over the ten-day timeline for this 
case MC&A detection occurs only on days 3, 6 and 9 when an activity other than 1 or 4 is 
performed.  Activity 3 is performed on these days and is defined to have a high level of 
dependence for its performance.  For the case with malicious insider mitigation for 





















Figure 34: Detection timelines for baseline set of MC&A activities, malicious insider, 
and insider mitigation. 
1 and activity 4, but there is still a high level of dependence for the performance of 
activity 4 because the same person (although not a malicious insider) always performs 
this task.  The operational change to remove the dep ndence between activities 1 and 4 to 
mitigate possible malicious insider actions results in additional daily MC&A detection 
that is at least as high as or higher than the baseline case.  
Table 18 provides the values for timely MC&A detection in the MAA and PA and 
the end state summaries for each of the three cases.  These results show that the case for 
malicious insider mitigation allows overall detection to recover up to the baseline case.  
These analyses demonstrate the application of the extended path analysis methodology to 
evaluate the effectiveness of a set of MC&A activities, to identify possible vulnerabilities 
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and to provide insights for operational strategies to address possible malicious insider 
activity.  
Table 18: Timely MC&A detection in the MAA (Event 2) and the PA (Event 4) and 
end state summary for baseline set of MC&A activities, malicious insider 
activity and insider mitigation 
5-day MAA/5-day PA 
timeline scenario with 
uniform theft distributions 
Timely MC&A 
Detection End State Summary 
MAA  
 Event 2 
PA 
Event 4 End State Probability 
MC&A detection timeline for 
baseline set of activities and 
dependency relationships 
0.980 0.507 
Material Recovered 0.746 
Alert 0.245 
Material Recovered 
 + Alert 
0.991 
Material Lost 0.009 
MC&A detection timeline 
assuming malicious insider 
for daily activities 1 and 4 
with high dependence 
relationship 
0.570 0.641 
Material Recovered 0.583 
Alert 0.272 
Material Recovered 
 + Alert 
0.855 
Material Lost 0.145 
MC&A detection timelines 
assuming insider mitigation 
for activity 4 
0.968 0.699 
Material Recovered 0.743 
Alert 0.248 
Material Recovered 
 + Alert 0.991 
Material Lost 0.009 
4.4 SUMMARY OF METHODS DEVELOPMENT FOR DAILY AND COMBINED MC&A  
DETECTION AND MULTIPLE PHYSICAL PROTECTION LAYERS 
The analyses presented in this chapter further demonstrate the use of the extended 
path analysis to model insider theft and integrated PPS and MC&A protection elements 
and to quantify the effectiveness of these protection elements against an insider threat.  
The methods provide tools to evaluate the protection level MC&A activities provide over 
time, identify gaps, and model potential insider activity.  The results provide insights on 
how MC&A activities can be implemented in facility operations to provide a desired 
level of protection over time.   
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Chapter 5:  Conclusions and Recommendations 
The goal of this research was to develop a probabilistic basis and a new method to 
incorporate MC&A protection elements explicitly within the existing probabilistic path 
analysis methodology to address insider theft.  To accomplish this, three problem areas 
were addressed:  
• “Detection” capabilities of MC&A protections and quantitative probabilities of 
detection – individually, in combination, and as a function of time; 
• Competing delay and detection timelines for insider th ft versus facility detection; 
and 
• Scenario development to integrate the evaluation of PPS and MC&A protections 
within physical protection layers.   
This work applied PRA methods to develop and demonstrate three key methods for 
incorporating MC&A protection elements in to the existing probabilistic path analysis 
methodology, as follows: 
1. HRA methods and HEPs for human performance of NPP operations to 
develop detection probabilities for MC&A activities; 
2. An object-based state paradigm to model the stages nd timing for insider 
theft and to characterize insider theft as a race against detection by facility 
MC&A activities; and 
3. ESDs to incorporate MC&A activities within the protec ion layers of a PPS, to 
develop insider theft scenarios, and to propagate de ction probabilities for a 
theft scenario. 
Using these approaches to characterize and evaluate MC&A activities has 
demonstrated the importance of these activities as protection elements for insider theft.  
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The application of HRA methods to define MC&A detection probabilities also identified 
three key factors for “designing” MC&A activities to address insider theft scenarios:  (1) 
the type of operation based on a desired probability of detection, (2) the level of 
dependence in the performance of the operation, and (3) the scenario timelines of interest 
for achieving timely detection.  While MC&A activities do not indicate actual detection 
of an insider adversary, the timely detection afforded by MC&A activities provides an 
alert that material is not where it should be.  Thepossible end states (Material Recovered, 
Alert, and Material Lost) for each theft scenario provide additional insights about the 
status and recovery of critical assets.  The “Materi l Recovered” end state indicates that 
an MC&A activity alerted the facility that material was not where it should be and that 
subsequent actions recovered the material before it could be taken out of the facility.  The 
“Material Lost” end state indicates that no MC&A alert occurred, and the facility has no 
information that material is missing even at the end of the scenario timeline.   
The demonstration analysis provides calculations for a range of initial MC&A 
detection probabilities and several scenarios with d fferent theft and MC&A detection 
timelines.  These calculations indicate that the methods developed in this work provide 
flexibility for application to a wide range of insider theft scenarios.  In evaluating the 
results of the analysis, however, it is evident that t ese methods are likely to be most 
applicable for discontinuous timeline and protracted theft scenarios.  Current methods are 
adequate for abrupt theft scenarios because these scenarios assume detection occurs 
almost immediately and thus can be analyzed using the exit path for an outside adversary 
attack. 
The methods resulting from this work have been developed within the framework 
of the existing path analysis methodology, and as such can be integrated with existing 
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methods and tools in a fairly straightforward manner.  Additional work in the following 
areas will be required to accomplish this fully.   
• Explore other approaches for developing insider adversary timelines and develop 
more concrete guidance for this part of the method. 
• Develop a comprehensive MC&A performance database to identify all possible 
MC&A activities and the corresponding BHEPs, similar to the performance 
database that has been developed for PPS protection elements.  Explore 
complementary aspects of the SFPI [20-22], Markov chain [53-56], and MSET 
[58-62] approaches that might provide the basis for pe formance data.  The 
database would include the initial probabilities of detection, and would relate 
these activities to insider positions and their associated performance, as well as 
access, knowledge and authority.  Development of an MC&A performance data 
base will facilitate automation of this method in a software tool. 
• Investigate the application of other HRA techniques in this methodology (e.g., 
Swain [64] and the NRC multidisciplinary framework [65]).  These techniques 
could support more detailed characterization of some MC&A activities to 
determine detection probabilities, as well as the development of the MC&A 
performance data base.  In addition, other HRA methods identify “error forcing 
contexts” and consider errors of omission as well as errors of commission for 
human operators.  An insider who could create an error forcing context in an area 
of facility operations may be able to establish as sy tem vulnerability that would 
facilitate a theft or diversion path.  
• Develop metrics to be applied with the extended path analysis methodology to 
show the relative importance of particular MC&A activities to preventing 
different types of insider theft scenarios.  The method has provided significant 
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insight for characterizing and evaluating a specific MC&A program against 
specific theft scenarios.  Importance metrics would extend these insights to allow 
analysts to better understand which MC&A operations are useful and which may 
be an added burden or expense and support decision maki g to improve efficiency 
and save money.  
• Analyze additional types of systems using this method to determine if more 
design heuristics for MC&A systems could be identified.   
• Use Monte Carle discrete event simulation methods t directly solve the problem 
for more complex timelines or MC&A inspection regimes. 
• Incorporate this method into a tool like ASSESS or ATLAS to automate insider 
path identification and link those paths to the generation of a discontinuous 
timeline and MC&A activities in the performance data base to form more realistic 
estimates of PE without hand-crafting every scenario.  Automated evaluation may 
also require linking with LHS so that the analyst has access to several types of 
probability distributions with which to represent the adversary timeline.    
The methods developed in this work support the probabilistic basis for and have 
enabled the development of an extended path analysis methodology in which MC&A 
protections can be combined with traditional sensor data in the calculation of PPS 
effectiveness.  Explicitly incorporating MC&A protection into the existing S&S system 
evaluation provides a basis to measure the effectiveness measure of the PPS against 
insider threats.  The resulting PE calculations will provide an integrated effectiveness 




Appendix A:  Combining Probability Distributions, A nalytic, or 
Continuous Variable Case3 
Let x and y be independent variables having the probability density functions px(x), py(y).  
If z = x + y, then the density function for z is expressed by the convolution integral 
( ) ( ) ( )∫
∞
∞−
−= dxxzpxpzp yxz  (A.3.2) 
Similarly, if 
yxz =  (A.3.3) 
then 














(with any ambiguity at x = 0 handled by limit operations from both sides in the obvious 
way). 
 
More generally, let 
( )yxfz ,=  (A.3.5) 
 
where, for any specific values of z and x, y has a specific value denoted by 
( );,1 xzfy −=  (A.3.6) 
 
that is 
( )( )[ ]xzfxfz ,, 1−≡  (A.3.7) 
 
Then 




11  (A.3.8) 
 
which may be thought of as a more general form of convolution.  Again, there are 
obvious further generalizations possible but this is ufficient for our purposes. 
 
In real life applied work, we rarely have the luxury of dealing with analytic forms and 
even in those rare cases may be unable to perform the integrations [Equation (A.3.8)] 
analytically.  We are therefore led to seek approximate procedures. 
 
                                               
3 The content here is an excerpt of Section A.3.1 from “Appendix A.  PRA Methodology Detail” [47].  




[1] U.S. Department of Energy. 2006. Material Control and Accountability, DOE M 
470.4-6. Washington DC:  U.S. Department of Energy. 
 
[2] Venkatesh, S., and C. Key. 2009. “A Self-Assessment of the Material Control and 
Accountability Implementation Function by National Nuclear Security 
Administration Headquarters (NNSA-HQ) Program Organiz tion,” in 
Proceedings of the 50th Annual Meeting of the Institute for Nuclear Materials 
Management. Deerfield IL: Institute of Nuclear Materials Management.  
 
[3] U.S. Department of Energy. 2005. Personnel Security, DOE M 470.4-5. 
Washington DC:  U.S. Department of Energy. 
 
[4] U.S. Department of Energy. 2009. Information Security, DOE M 470.4-4A. 
Washington DC:  U.S. Department of Energy. 
 
[5] Morzinski, J., and P. Dawson. 2000. “Designing Safeguards Performance 
Analysis to Determine and Validate Detection Probabilities, “Proceedings of the 
41st Annual Meeting of the Institute for Nuclear Materials Management. Deerfield 
IL: Institute of Nuclear Materials Management. 
 
[6] Dawson, P.G., and P. Hester, 2006. “Real-Time Effectiv ness Approach to 
Protecting Nuclear Materials,” Proceedings of the 47th Annual Meeting of the 
Institute for Nuclear Materials Management. Deerfield IL: Institute of Nuclear 
Materials Management. 
 
[7] Dawson, P.G., P. Hester, T. Suski, and C. Williams. 2007. Real-Time 
Effectiveness Approach to Protecting Nuclear Materils, LCP SNL-1709, 
Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information. Albuquerque NM: Sandia National 
Laboratories.  
 
[8] Sandia National Laboratories. 2005. Department of Energy Office of Security and 
Safety Performance Assurance, Technology Transfer Manual, Vulnerability 
Assessment, SAND05-3929P, Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information. 
Albuquerque NM:  Sandia National Laboratories. 
 
[9] International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). 1999. The Physical Protection of 
Nuclear Materials and Nuclear Facilities, IAEA-INFCIRC/225/Rev. 4 
(Corrected). Vienna: IAEA. 
 
[10] U.S. Dept. of the Army. 2001. Physical Security, Report FM 3-19.30. 
 
101 
[11] IAEA, 2002. Handbook on the physical protection of nuclear materials and 
facilities, IAEA-TECDOC-1276, Official Use Only. Vienna: IAEA. 
 
[12] Jaeger, C.D. 2002, “Risk Assessment Methodology for Chemical Facilities,” in 
Probabilistic Safety Assessment and Management PSAM6, E. J. Bonano, A. L. 
Camp, M. J. Majors, and R. A. Thompson (eds.), pp. 1471-1476. Oxford:  
Elsevier Science Ltd. 
 
[13] Bashurov, V V., V.O., Filimonenkov, A.A. Yaroslavtsev, and Y.I. Churikov. 
2004. “Evaluation of Risk of Security Failure of a Protected Object,” Journal of 
Nuclear Materials Management, Vol. XXXIII, No. 1, pp. 31-35. Deerfield IL: 
Institute of Nuclear Materials Management. 
 
[14] Kim, C., S. Kwak, and C-H. Chung. 2005. “A Simulation Methodology for the 
Evaluation of the Physical Protection Systems in Nuclear Power Plants,” 
Transactions, Vol. 93, pp. 320-321. Lagrange Park IL: American Nuclear Society. 
 
[15] Whitehead, D.W., C.S. Potter, and S.L. O’Connor. 2007. Nuclear Power Plant 
Security Assessment Technical Manual, SAND2007-5591. Albuquerque NM:  
Sandia National Laboratories. 
 
[16] U.S. Department of Energy. 2005. “Safeguards and Security Program 
References,” DOE M 470.4-1.Washington DC:  U.S. Department of Energy. 
 
[17] Garcia, M.L. 2008. The Design and Evaluation of Physical Protection Systems 
Second Edition, Boston: Butterworth-Heinemann. 
 
[18] Garcia, M.L. 2005. Vulnerability Assessment of Physical Protection Systems. 
Boston:  Elsevier Butterworth-Heinemann. 
 
[19] Cipiti, B.B. 2009. “Virtual Safeguards Testing for P ocess Monitoring and 
Advanced Materials Accountancy,” in Proceedings of the 50th Annual Meeting of 
the Institute for Nuclear Materials Management. Deerfield IL: Institute of 
Nuclear Materials Management. 
 
[20] Poorbaugh, J. 2009. “Comprehensive Analysis of Safeguards Strategies 
(COMPASS) as a Program Effectiveness Indicator,” in Proceedings of the 50th 
Annual Meeting of the Institute for Nuclear Materials Management. Deerfield IL: 
Institute of Nuclear Materials Management. 
 
[21] Whitworth, A. 2009. “Safeguards First Principles Initiative (SFPI),” in 
Proceedings of the 50th Annual Meeting of the Institute for Nuclear Materials 
Management. Deerfield IL: Institute of Nuclear Materials Management. 
 
102 
[22] Johnson, G. 2008. “Criteria for Determination of MC&A System Effectiveness,” 
in Proceedings of the 49th Annual Meeting of the Institute for Nuclear Materials 
Management. Deerfield IL: Institute of Nuclear Materials Management. 
 
[23] Cipiti, B.B., P.E. Rexroth, and N.L. Ricker. 2007, Safeguards Performance 
Modeling of a UREX+1a Reprocessing Plant, SAND2007-6586. Albuquerque 
NM: Sandia National Laboratories. 
 
[24] Parker, R. 2007. Inventory of Safeguards Software, LA-UR-07-6991. Los Alamos 
NM: Los Alamos National Laboratory.  
 
[25] Hines, J.W., and J. Bowling. 2004. “An Expert System for Long-Term 
Monitoring of Special Nuclear Materials,” Journal of Nuclear Materials 
Management, Vol. XXXIII, No. 4, pp. 13-21. Deerfield IL: Institute of Nuclear 
Materials Management. 
 
[26] Raeder, C.R., D. Farmer, H. Burns, B. Trivett, and L. Bowers. 2004. “The Local 
Area Nuclear Material Accountability Software, (LANMAS),” Journal of Nuclear 
Materials Management, Vol. XXXIII, No. 1, pp. 55-58. Deerfield IL: Institute of 
Nuclear Materials Management. 
 
[27] Janssens-Maenhout, G., and L. Dechamp. 2004. “Process Monitoring Appropriate 
for Near-Real-Time Accountancy,” Journal of Nuclear Materials Management, 
Vol. XXXII, No. 3, pp. 10-16. Deerfield IL: Institute of Nuclear Materials 
Management. 
 
[28] Waddoups, I.G., 1996, “National and International Nuclear Material Monitoring,” 
presented at The 12th Annual Joint Government-Industry Security Technology 
Symposium & Exhibition, June-17-20, Williamsburg, VA. 
 
[29] Jaeger, C., and I. Waddoups. 1995. “Nuclear Material Control in the United 
States,” presented at the Workshop on Physical Protecti n, September 11-14, 
Moscow, Russia. 
 
[30] Rodriguez, C. A., and I. Waddoups. 1993. “Safeguards Experience with Materials 
Monitoring Systems,” Journal of Nuclear Materials Management. Deerfield IL: 
Institute of Nuclear Materials Management. 
 
[31] Waddoups, I.G., and J.A. Abbott. 1993. “Material Contr l Evaluation,” in 
Proceedings of the 34th Annual Meeting of the Institute for Nuclear Materials 
Management. Deerfield IL: Institute of Nuclear Materials Management. 
 
[32] Sandia National Laboratories. 2006. Advanced Vulnerability Analysis Overview 
Course, SAND2006-2096P.  Albuquerque NM: Sandia Nation l Laboratories. 
 
103 
[33] Bennett, H. A. 1977. The EASI Approach to Physical Security Evaluation, 
SAND76-0500. Albuquerque NM: Sandia National Laborat ries. 
 
[34] Sandia National Laboratories 1989. SAVI:  Systematic Analysis of Vulnerability 
to Intrusion, Vol. 1 and 2, SAND89-0926. Albuquerque NM: Sandia National 
Laboratories. 
 
[35] ASSESS (Analytical System and Software for Evaluating Safeguards and 
Security), Version 2.56, Copyright 1989-2003. Livermore CA: Lawrence 
Livermore National Laboratory. 
 
[36] ATLAS (Adversary Time-Line Analysis System) Software, Version 4.2. Build 
171, developed at Sandia National Laboratories for the U.S. Department of 
Energy. 
 
[37] Mullen, S. A., J.J. Davidson, and H.B. Jones, Jr. 1980. Potential Threat to 
Licensed Nuclear Activities from Insiders (Insider Study), NUREG-0703. 
Washington DC: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. 
 
[38] Sutton, R H. 1983. Insider Adversary Study for the Office of Safeguards and 
Security, U.S. Department of Energy, Final Report, IEAL-294. Washington DC:  
International Energy Associates Limited. 
 
[39] Hoffman, B., C. Meyer, B. Schwarz, and J. Duncan. 1990. Insider Crime:  The 
Threat to Nuclear Facilities and Programs, R-3782-DOE, prepared for the U.S. 
Department of Energy. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporati n. 
 
[40] Brackney, R.C., and R.H. Anderson. 2004. Understanding the Insider Threat, 
Proceedings of a March 2004 Workshop. Santa Monica, CA:  RAND 
Corporation. 
 
[41] U.S. Department of Defense. 2000. DoD Insider Threat Mitigation, Final Report 
of the Insider Threat Integrated Process Team. 
 
[42] Goodwin, K.E., J.C. Schleter, and M.D.K. Maltese. 1978.  Diversion Path 
Analysis Handbook, HCP/D6010-01/1. Washington DC:  U.S. Department of 
Energy. 
 
[43] Boozer, D.D., and D. Engi.  1977.  Insider Safeguards Effectiveness Model 
(ISEM) Users Guide, SAND77-0043. Albuquerque NM: Sandi  National 
Laboratories. 
 
[44] Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. 1984. Safeguards Evaluation Method – 
Insider Threat, UCID-20145, Rev. 2. Livermore CA: University of California. 
 
104 
[45] U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. 1975. Reactor Safety Study – An 
Assessment of Accident Risks in U.S. Commercial Nuclear Power Plants, 
WASH-1400 (NUREG-75/014). Washington DC: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission. 
 
[46] Breeding, R.J., J.C. Helton, E.D. Gorham, and F.T. Harper. 1992. “Summary 
Description of the Methods Using in the Probabilistic Risk Assessment for 
NUREG-1150,” Nuclear Engineering and Design 135, pp. 1-27. Amsterdam:  
North Holland. 
 
[47] Houston Lighting and Power Company. 1989. South Texas Project Probabilistic 
Safety Assessment, PLG-0675. Houston TX: Houston Lighting and Power 
Company. 
 
[48] U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. 1995. “Use of Pr babilistic Risk 
Assessment Methods in Nuclear Activities:  Final Policy Statement,” Federal 
Register, Vol. 60, p. 42622, August 16. 
 
[49] Jaeger, C.D. 2002. “Risk Assessment Methodology for Chemical Facilities,” in 
Probabilistic Safety Assessment and Management PSAM6, E. J. Bonano, A. L. 
Camp, M. J. Majors, and R. A. Thompson (eds.), pp. 1471-1476. Oxford:  
Elsevier Science Ltd. 
 
[50] Lockheed Martin Missiles & Space. 1997. GPHS-RTGs in Support of the Cassini 
Mission Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR). Philadelphia PA: Lockheed 
Martin. 
 
[51] Miller, D. and J. Forester. 2000. Aviation Safety Human Reliability Analysis 
Method (ASHRAM), SAND2000-2955. Albuquerque NM: Sandia National 
Laboratories. 
 
[52] Wheeler, T.A., K. Gawande, K. and S. Bespalko. 1997. “Development of Risk-
Based Ranking Measures of Effectiveness for the United States Coast Guard’s 
Vessel Inspection Program,” Risk Analysis, Vol. 17, No. 3. Society for Risk 
Analysis. 
 
[53] Yue, M., L. Cheng, and R. Bari. 2005.  Application f Probabilistic Methods to 
Proliferation Resistance:  Misuse, Diversion, and Abrogation Scenarios.  Upton 
NY:  Brookhaven National Laboratory. 
 
[54] Yue, M., L. Cheng, I. Papazoglou, M. Azarm, and R. A. Bari. 2005. “Calculations 
of Proliferation Resistance for Generation III Nuclear Energy Systems,” 
Proceedings of Global 2005 International Conference on Nuclear Energy System 
for Future Generation and Global Sustainability, Tsukuba Japan.  
 
105 
[55] Yue, M., L. Cheng, and R. A. Bari. 2008. “A Markov Model Approach to 
Proliferation-Resistance Assessment of Nuclear Energy Systems,” Nuclear 
Technology, Vol. 162, pp. 26-44. 
 
[56] Yue, M., L. Cheng, and R. A. Bari. 2009. “Relative Proliferation Risks for 
Different Fuel Cycle Arrangements,” Nuclear Technology, Vol. 165, pp. 1-17.  
 
[57] “Evaluation Methodology for Proliferation Resistance and Physical Protection of 
Generation IV Nuclear Energy Systems.” 2006. Proliferation Resistance and 
Physical Protection Evaluation Method Experts Group, available on the Internet at 
http://www.gen-4.org/Technology/horizontal/PRPPEM.pdf  
 
[58] Sviridov, A.S., A.A. Petrov, I.N. Sazonov ,V.V. Erastov, A.V. Stepashko, A.A. 
Voronkov, B. Jensen, R. Elwood, L. Neymotin, and C. Roche. 2009. “Application 
of MSET Method for Assessing Effectiveness of the Material Control & 
Accounting System at a Nuclear Facility,” in Proceedings of the 50th Annual 
Meeting of the Institute for Nuclear Materials Management. Deerfield IL: 
Institute of Nuclear Materials Management. 
 
[59] Elwood, R., R. Brown, B.J. Campbell, C. Duncan, G.M. Fuller, G. Hammond, D. 
Hyde, B. Jensen, E. Owings, W. Brunsdon, M. Fontana, W. Kenna, G. Klopp, L. 
Neymotin, and C. Roche. 2008. “Benchmarking MSET: A Progress Report On 
The MC&A System Effectiveness Tool,” in Proceedings of the 49th Annual 
Meeting of the Institute for Nuclear Materials Management. Deerfield IL: 
Institute of Nuclear Materials Management. 
 
[60] Meppen, B., T. Bean, R. Haga, K. Moedl, J. Sanders, M.A. Thom. 2008. 
“Validation of Nuclear Material Control and Accountability (MC&A) System 
Effectiveness Tool (MSET) at Idaho National Laboraty (INL),” in Proceedings 
of the 49th Annual Meeting of the Institute for Nuclear Materials Management. 
Deerfield IL: Institute of Nuclear Materials Managem nt. 
 
[61] Elwood, R., B.J. Campbell, G.M. Fuller, G. Hammond, D. Hyde, B. Jensen, E. 
Owings, W. Brunsdon, M. Fontana, W. Kenna, G. Klopp, and C. Roche.  2007. 
“Nuclear Material Control And Accountability (MC&A) Functional Model And 
MC&A System Effectiveness Tool (MSET),” in Proceedings of the 48th Annual 
Meeting of the Institute for Nuclear Materials Management. Deerfield IL: 
Institute of Nuclear Materials Management. 
 
[62] Klopp, G.T., M. Fontana, C.T. Roche, W. Brunsdon, R.H. Elwood, B.A. Jensen, 
G.M. Fuller, B.J. Campbell, Hammond, E. Owings, W. Kenna. 2007. “The Use of 
Probabilistic Risk Assessment Technology for Evaluating MC&A Effectiveness 
and Relative Risk Contributions,” in Proceedings of the 48th Annual Meeting of 
the Institute for Nuclear Materials Management. Deerfield IL: Institute of 
Nuclear Materials Management. 
106 
 
[63] Wyss, G.D., and F.A. Durán. 2001. OBEST:  The Object-Based Event Scenario 
Tree Methodology, SAND2001-0828. Albuquerque NM: Sandi  National 
Laboratories. 
 
[64] Swain III, A.D., and H.E. Guttmann. 1983. Handbook f Human Reliability 
Analysis with Emphasis on Nuclear Power Plants, SAND80-0200. Albuquerque 
NM: Sandia National Laboratories. 
 
[65] Barriere, M.T., J.Wreathall, S.E. Cooper, D.C. Bley, W.J. Luckas, and A. Ramey-
Smith. 1995. Multidisciplinary Framework for Human Reliability Analysis with 
an Application to Errors of Commission and Dependencies, NUREG/CR-6526. 
Washington DC: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. 
 
[66] Cooper, S.E., A.M. Ramey-Smith, J. Wreathall, G.W. Parry, D.C. Bley, W.J. 
Luckas, J.H. Taylor, and M.T. Barriere. 1996. A Technique for Human Error 




Felicia Angelica Durán is a nuclear engineer in the Security Systems Analysis 
Department at Sandia National Laboratories (Sandia) in Albuquerque, New Mexico.  She 
joined Sandia in September 1995 and was promoted to Principal Member of Technical 
Staff in August 2002.  Felicia is a member of the Institute of Nuclear Materials 
Management (INMM), serves as Associated Editor for Physical Protection of the Journal 
of Nuclear Materials Management, and is on the Executive Committee of the Southwest 
Chapter of INMM.  She earned her Masters Degree in Nuclear Engineering in December 
1995 from The University of New Mexico (UNM) and was inducted into the UNM 
chapter of Tau Beta Pi, the National Engineering Honor Society.  In May 1985, she 
received her Bachelors Degree in Materials Science and Engineering from the 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), where sh  was an active student leader, 
president of the Hispanic student group, a Charter Member of Alpha Phi (the first sorority 
at MIT) and an officer of the Intrafraternity Council, among other activities.  She was 
awarded the MIT Karl Taylor Compton Award in 1985 for outstanding sustained 
community contribution. 
Felicia has more than 20 years of professional experience supporting technical 
research programs for the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and the U.S. 
Department of Energy (DOE).  Most recent technical areas of experience include:  
integrated safeguards and security; security systems analysis; insider threat analysis; 
systems reliability and risk analysis; risk-informed regulation; methodology and software 
development for (1) nuclear reactor equipment condition monitoring and reliability, (2) 
object-based risk analysis methods with applications to aviation safety, and (3) dose 
modeling for decontamination and decommissioning; ad technical project management.  
108 
Other areas of experience include Level 2 probabilistic risk analysis (PRA) for boiling 
water reactors; environmental decision support; conceptual model development and 
treatment of uncertainty for performance assessment of waste management sites; expert 
judgement elicitation; regulatory compliance integration; waste management program 
support; geologic repository technology; nuclear waste transportation systems; 
emergency response training; and arms treaty verification.   
She was born in Cuba, New Mexico, the oldest of four children.  Her father was a 
coach with Cuba Schools and a coach, educator and mid le school counselor with 
Albuquerque Public Schools in New Mexico.  Her mother was a secretary for the Cuba 
Schools Superintendent, and for Longfellow, Mountain View and Dolores Gonzales 
Elementary Schools in Albuquerque.  Felicia attended Armijo Elementary School and 
Ernie Pyle Middle School, and graduated Valedictorian of her class from Rio Grande 
High School in Albuquerque.  She is the mother of a 14-year old daughter.  Felicia has 
coached and plays soccer, and is an active community volunteer.  She plays racquetball 
and has served on the local organizing committee for the World Senior Racquetball 
Championships since 1988.  In 2003, she was one of four women nominated by Sandia 
for the Outstanding Women of Color in Research and Technology Awards; as one of the 
first 40 women to receive Emerald Honors, she was honored for Professional 
Achievement.  In 2005, she received one of the Mayor Martin Chavez’s first Move Up 
awards in recognition for her volunteer service in Albuquerque. 
 
Permanent address: 11501 Paseo del Oso NE, Albuquerque, NM  87111 
This dissertation was typed by the author. 
